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ABSTRACT
I experimentally examine whether disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment
facilitates cooperation in business collaborations. Business collaborations are essential for firms
to maintain their competitive advantage. However, half of all ventures fail. A major reason for
this high failure rate is a lack of cooperation among business collaboration partners, known as
relational risk. Findings suggest that CSR disclosure leads to greater CSR investment, but does
not result in an overall higher level of cooperation. However, CSR disclosure moderates the link
between CSR investment and cooperation. When CSR investment is disclosed, cooperation is
highest when both managers invest in CSR. Further, managers who invest in CSR are more
sensitive to CSR disclosure information than managers who do not invest in CSR. Managers who
invest in CSR are more cooperative when they receive a signal their partner also invested in
CSR. Managers who do not invest in CSR do not attend to CSR disclosure information and are
equally cooperative when partnered with a CSR investor or a non-CSR investor. Finally, when
CSR investment is not disclosed, managers who invest in CSR are no more likely to cooperate
than managers who do not invest in CSR. Although CSR is widespread, little is known about
why managers invest in CSR or disclose CSR information. This study has implications for
practitioners and academics on CSR by demonstrating a potential benefit of CSR investment and
disclosure, mitigating relational risk in business collaborations.

v

1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility (hereafter referred to as CSR) refers to a firm’s integration
of societal and/or environmental concerns through business practices and contributions of
resources (Bhattacharya et al. 2008; Dahlsrud 2008). CSR investment and disclosure has grown
rapidly over the past 20 years. Further, disclosure of CSR investment has become increasingly
commonplace. To wit, in a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 1,344 CEO’s in 68
countries, 74% of CEO’s indicated that measuring and reporting CSR contributes to long-term
success (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2014).
CSR investment and disclosure reduces information asymmetry in capital markets and
labor markets (e.g. Greening and Turban 2000; Brekke and Nyborg 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2012).
CSR investment and disclosure is associated with lower cost of capital, improved analyst
forecast precision, reduced negative shocks to stock price (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al.
2012), and improved future performance (Lys et al. 2015). CSR investment is associated with
higher earnings quality (Kim et al. 2012), and conservative tax policy (Hoi et al. 2013),
suggesting that CSR investment is indicative of manager’s values regarding fiscal policy.
Further, employee motivation and effort are higher when firms invest in and disclose CSR
(Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Koppel and Regner 2014). 1 Findings suggest that managers may
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Balakrishnan et al. (2011) article appeared in The Accounting Review Special Edition on Corporate Social
Responsibility. However, the authors do not explicitly state that charitable donations are an operationalization of
CSR.
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invest in CSR and disclose CSR in response to preferences of investors, and to attract and retain
employees (Martin and Moser 2016; Greening and Turban 2000).
Despite the growing prevalence of CSR investment and disclosure, there is a great deal of
skepticism regarding the sincerity of CSR investment and the credibility of CSR disclosures
among investors, customers, the popular press, and academics (Pope and Waeraas 2016). Many
believe that firms are profiting from insincere claims of CSR and the terms “green-washing” and
“CSR-washing” are becoming increasingly commonplace (Mattis 2008). Results from domestic
and international surveys consistently suggest that consumers believe that CSR investment and
disclosure is undertaken superficially as the basis for marketing campaigns (Katz 2008; Kanter
2009). Thus, it remains an open question how stakeholders view CSR investment and disclosure.
This study builds on the nascent CSR literature in accounting by examining the
association between CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and cooperation in business
collaborations. Since the early 2000’s, firms have increasingly engaged in business
collaborations to access complementary competencies that would be too difficult or time
consuming to develop alone (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Inkpen and Ross, 2001). Business
collaborations can take many forms and can include outsourcing, joint research and
development, knowledge and technology sharing, and joint marketing arrangements (De Rond
2003; Anderson and Dekker 2014). Recent survey evidence finds that 85% of respondents
believe that business collaborations are essential for firm growth (Business Performance
Innovation Network 2014). However, despite the popularity of business collaborations,
approximately half end in failure (Gerwin 2004; Lunnan and Haugland 2008).
One cause of the high rate of failure in business collaborations is lack of cooperation,
known as relational risk (Das and Teng 1998). An important determinant of cooperation in
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business collaborations is organizational culture (Cartwright and Cooper 1993; Weber et al.
1996; Pothukuchi et al. 2002). Organizational culture, norms, and values comprise a firm’s
informal control system. Experimental research in accounting suggests that informal controls can
have a significant interactive effect with formal control systems on cooperation in intrafirm work
groups and intrafirm business collaborations (Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Kelly and Presslee 2017;
Coletti et al. 2005).
I experimentally examine the business collaboration setting using a strategic interaction
task in which two participants simultaneously choose whether to cooperate or not cooperate. I
use a single-period modified stag hunt task which operationalizes the risk involved with
cooperation in business collaborations. Earnings are such that cooperation is risky but potentially
wealth-maximizing, while non-cooperation is riskless. The use of a strategic interaction task
answers recent calls in the accounting literature to examine CSR investment and disclosure using
experimental methodologies (Martin and Moser 2012; Huang and Watson 2015). Further, using
experimental economics methodology directly answers the call for the use of game theoretic
methodologies to encourage cooperation and mitigate relational risk in business collaborations
(Parkhe 1993).
Similar to prior experimental studies, I operationalize CSR investment as a charitable
donation in which participants choose whether or not to donate a portion of their earnings from
the stag hunt task to charity (e.g. Brekke et al. 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Martin and Moser
2016). I examine the effect of CSR disclosure by manipulating disclosure at two levels betweenparticipants, Disclosure and Non-Disclosure. In the Disclosure treatment, participants are
truthfully informed of whether or not their partner donated to charity. In the Non-Disclosure
treatment, participants are not informed of whether or not their partner donated to charity.
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Prior research posits that individuals invest in CSR because they are other-regarding, and
this other-regarding preference also leads them to be more cooperative (Brekke and Nyborg
2008; Brekke et al. 2011). However, it is not clear whether a presumably other-regarding
manager who invests in CSR is more likely to cooperate in business collaborations than
managers who do not invest in CSR. This is because cooperation in a business collaboration is a
function of a manager’s preference for cooperation as well as her beliefs about her partner’s
preference for cooperation. I posit that CSR disclosure is a positive signal of a manager’s
preference for cooperation and facilitates cooperation in business collaborations.
Results suggest that managers are more likely to invest in CSR when CSR is disclosed
versus when CSR is not disclosed. However, I do not find that the overall level of cooperation in
business collaborations is higher when CSR is disclosure versus when CSR is not disclosed.
Experimental findings provide evidence that CSR disclosure moderates the link between CSR
investment and cooperation in business collaborations. Given CSR is disclosed, cooperation is
highest in business collaborations when both managers invest in CSR and lowest when both
managers do not invest in CSR. Further, CSR investors are more sensitive to CSR disclosure
than non-CSR investors. When CSR is disclosed, CSR investors are more cooperative when
partnered with a CSR investor than when partnered with a non-CSR investor. However, nonCSR investors do not attend to CSR disclosure information; non-CSR investors are no more
cooperative when partnered with a CSR investor versus a non-CSR investor. Lastly, when CSR
is not disclosed, managers who invest in CSR are no more cooperative than managers who do
not invest in CSR. In summary, results suggest that CSR disclosure is a credible signal of a
manager’s propensity to cooperate and facilitates cooperation in business collaborations among
CSR investors.
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This study answers the call for additional accounting research on CSR investment and
disclosure and contributes to the accounting literature in several ways (Martin and Moser 2012;
Huang and Watson 2015). This study builds on the extant accounting research that examines the
use of formal and informal control mechanisms to encourage intrafirm and interfirm cooperation
(e.g. Rowe 2004; Coletti et al. 2005; Kelly and Presslee 2017). This study also contributes to
accounting research examining whether CSR investment and disclosure are informative of
managerial type (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Hoi et al. 2013). This is the first
study to examine the association between CSR disclosure, CSR investment, and cooperation in
business collaborations. Results from this study contribute to the literature on business
collaborations and provide experimental evidence that CSR investment and disclosure can
mitigate relational risk.
In the remainder of this dissertation, I discuss the background literature in Section 2 and
present the hypothesis in Section 3. In Section 4 I describe the experimental methodology used to
test the hypotheses. In Section 5 I discuss the statistical analysis and report the results. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations of the study, future research, and
implications in Section 6.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This study integrates three distinct streams of literature on CSR, business collaborations,
and internal controls to develop hypotheses regarding the links between CSR investment, CSR
disclosure, and cooperation in business collaborations. In this section, I review the relevant
findings from each of these bodies of research. First, I will define CSR and discuss findings on
CSR with respect to capital markets and labor markets. Second, I review the literature on
business collaborations, the setting in which I examine the role of CSR investment and
disclosure. Lastly, I discuss the relevant literature on internal controls, with an emphasis on the
use of organizational culture, an informal control that has been shown to facilitate both intrafirm
and interfirm cooperation.
Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR refers to a firm’s integration of societal and/or environmental concerns through
business practices and contributions of resources (Bhattacharya et al. 2008a; Dahlsrud 2008).
Investments in CSR include donating to charities, abstaining from the use of child labor in
developing countries, reducing harmful emissions, and involvement in employee-volunteer
community projects (Auld et al. 2008; Vertigans and Idowu 2017). While CSR has grown
steadily over the past 20 years, there is substantial industry, geo-political, and firm level
variation. For example, companies that operate in industries that entail a degree of risk to people
or the environment may be more motivated to invest in CSR to stave off criticism and avoid
costly regulation. While the vast majority of CSR activities are voluntary, investments in CSR
6

may sometimes be mandatory. For instance, in India, large public companies are required to
spend 2% of their net profits on CSR activities (Mukherjee and Bird 2016).
CSR disclosure has grown rapidly in the 2000’s. Worldwide, the percentage of
companies releasing a sustainability report has grown from 20% to 80% over the past five years
(Gilbert 2015; Ioannou and Serafeim 2017). While CSR disclosure in the U.S. is voluntary,
several foreign regulators have moved towards mandated CSR disclosure. For example, large,
public companies in India, China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa are required to provide
CSR disclosures (Ioannou and Serafeim 2017).
The extant literature on CSR investment and disclosure is mainly focused on the link
between CSR and two stakeholder groups, employees and shareholders. First, I will discuss the
literature on CSR in labor markets which examines how CSR investment and disclosure affects
current and potential employees. Second, I will discuss the literature on CSR in capital markets
which explores the links between CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and shareholders and
financial intermediaries.
My dissertation builds on these two streams of literature by examining the links between
CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and cooperation in business collaborations. This is the first
study to examine whether disclosure of CSR investment can benefit organizations by facilitating
cooperation among business collaboration partners. This study answers the call for research in
accounting that investigates the link between CSR and stakeholders constituents beyond
shareholders (Moser and Martin 2012). CSR investment and disclosure is motivated by the
preferences of various internal and external stakeholders (Moser and Martin 2012). Internal
stakeholders include board members, executives, managers, and employees. External
stakeholders include current and potential investors, financial intermediaries, creditors,
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regulators, suppliers, customers, and potential employees. The reason for costly CSR investment
is often explained via an indirect link with financial performance using the stakeholder view of
the firm (Freeman 1984; Moser and Martin 2012). Thus, the justification for CSR investment is
that while it is costly, it ultimately improves shareholder wealth through various channels, such
as consumers’ willingness to pay for ethically produced goods (De Pelsmacker et al. 2005), the
pre-emption of regulations or sanctions (Lyon and Maxwell 2008), shareholders’ willingness to
invest in CSR firms (Martin and Moser 2016), and/or improved employee motivation (Koppel
and Regner 2014; Bhattacharya et al. 2008b; Balakrishnan et al. 2011).
2.1.1. CSR and labor markets
Disclosure of CSR investment acts as a signal in the labor market, conveying information
about a firm’s culture, values, and norms regarding social welfare to current and prospective
employees. Experimental and field evidence suggests that CSR has a positive effect on employee
motivation (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Brekke et al. 2011; Koppel and Regner 2014) and can be a
powerful tool to attract potential employees (Bhattacharya et al. 2008a; Greening and Turban
2000). Recent experimental studies find that employee contributions are positively associated
with managers’ investments in CSR. It is worth noting that in these studies, CSR investment is
always disclosed (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Brekke et al. 2011; Koppel and Regner 2014).
Using a modified sender-receiver trust game, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) find that
managerial investments in CSR are associated with employee motivation. In the experiment, a
sender (employee) receives an initial endowment and can contribute any amount of the
endowment to the receiver (manager), which is automatically tripled. In the no reward treatment,
the manager keeps the tripled contribution. Thus, any contributions from employees are viewed
as altruistic. In the reward treatment, the manager can return any portion of the tripled
8

contribution to the employee. Prior to the employee’s contribution to the manager, the manager
commits to donate between 0% and 100% of the tripled contribution to charity. In the no reward
treatment, employees’ contributions increase monotonically with managers’ charitable donations.
In the reward treatment, employees’ contributions are highest at modest levels of charitable
donations (i.e. 30%). Further, findings indicate that charity importance is an important indicator
of employees’ reaction to managers’ CSR investment. Employees who believe that giving to
charity is important contribute more and are more responsive to increases in CSR investment. In
summary, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) find that managers’ CSR investment is positively associated
with employee contributions to the firm, and this association is stronger among employees who
believe that giving to charity is important.
Similar to Balakrishnan et al. (2011), Koppel and Regner (2014) use a single-period,
sequential experimental economics task to examine the role of CSR investment on employee
motivation. A manager-employee gift exchange task is employed in which the manager is
endowed with wealth and chooses how much to contribute to the employee in the form of flat
pay. The employee then decides how much costly effort to exert. The greater the effort, the
greater the profit for the manager and the less the employee earns. In essence, effort is a gift the
employee bestows upon the manager. Prior to determining the employee’s flat pay, the manager
chooses whether or not to invest in CSR by donating between 0% and 30% of her profit to
charity. Koppel and Regner (2014) find that approximately half of managers donate to charity
and that employees’ costly effort is positively associated with the level of CSR investment.
Further, when a manager donates to an employee’s preferred charity, the employee exerts more
effort, independent of the level of CSR investment.
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My study builds on Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Koppel and Regner (2014) in two
ways. First, I extend both studies by examining whether managers’ CSR investment affects the
behavior of a different stakeholder group, business collaboration partners. Second, the purpose of
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Koppel and Regner (2014) is to examine how employees react to
managers’ CSR investment choices, thus CSR investment is always disclosed. I examine how
disclosure of CSR investment impacts cooperation between managers in business collaborations.
Consequently, I examine two settings, one in which CSR is disclosed and one in which CSR is
not disclosed.
While Balakrishnan et al. (2011) and Koppel and Regner (2014) demonstrate that
managers’ investment in CSR is positively associated with motivation and effort of current
employees, CSR investment and disclosure has also been shown to be an effective mechanism to
attract potential employees. Findings indicate that CSR investment and disclosure reduce
information asymmetry in the labor market by acting as a signal to potential employees about
what it will be like to work at the firm (Greening and Turban 2000; Brekke and Nyborg 2008;
Bhattacharya et al. 2008). To wit, companies including Cisco Systems, General Electric, and
Home Depot view CSR investment as an integral part of their strategy for attracting and
retaining talented employees (Bhattacharya et al. 2008; Grow et al. 2005). Using hypothetical
firm descriptions, Greening and Turban (2000), find that potential employees are more attracted
to CSR firms than non-CSR firms. Participants rated their job pursuit intentions, probability of
interview, and probability to accept a job offer higher for CSR firms than non-CSR firms.
Further, survey evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the workforce is willing to be paid
less to work for a company whose values match their own, and CSR investment is associated
with lower wages (Nyborg and Zhang 2013).
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Experimental evidence suggests that CSR firms are able to attract more cooperative
employees (Brekke et al. 2011). Using a three-person, repeated public goods task, Brekke et al.
(2011) examine intrafirm cooperation in work teams. Potential employees can either go to work
for a CSR firm by donating a fixed amount to charity, or go to work for a non-CSR firm by
keeping a fixed amount for themselves. Employees decide how much of their endowment to
allocate to the work team. The amount allocated to the work team is doubled and divided equally
among the employees. An employee’s payoff is maximized when everyone allocates the
maximum amount to the work team (i.e. fully cooperate). However, the Nash equilibrium is for
each employee to allocate nothing (i.e. not cooperate). Employees who choose to work for a CSR
firm are more cooperative with their fellow employees and contribute more to their work team
than employees who chose to work for a non-CSR firm. Further, over time cooperation remains
stable among the CSR firm work teams, while it deteriorates among the non-CSR firm work
teams.
Similar to Brekke et al. (2011) I also examine whether CSR investors are more
cooperative than non-CSR investors. However, my study differs from Brekke et al. (2011) in
several important aspects. First, the authors examine the link between CSR investment and
cooperation in work teams within a single organization. While this is an important question, my
study examines the links between CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and cooperation among
business collaboration partners across seperate organizations. This distinction is important
because it is much more costly and difficult to employ formal control mechanisms to facilitate
cooperation across organizations than within organizations (Das and Teng 1998). Thus, it is
useful to examine alternative mechanisms to facilitate cooperation in business collaborations.
Further, in my study I examine the effect of CSR disclosure, independent of CSR investment, on
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cooperation. The role of CSR disclosure was not the focus of Brekke et al. (2011). Consequently,
CSR disclosure is neither measured nor manipulated. As a result, it is not clear whether the
results would hold in a setting in which employees’ CSR investment was not disclosed. The
authors posit that the link between CSR investment and cooperation is because CSR investors are
other-regarding and have preferences for cooperation (Brekke and Nyborg 2008; Brekke et al.
2011). However, it is not clear whether a CSR investor would be more cooperative in a business
collaboration than a non-CSR investor. This is because cooperation in business collaborations
involves risk, as a partner can act opportunistically and it is difficult to use a formal control
mechanisms to compel cooperation (Das and Teng 1998). Thus, cooperation in a business
collaboration is a function of both a managers’ preference for cooperation as well as her belief
about her partner’s propensity to cooperate. In the absence of CSR disclosure, it is not clear that
CSR investors’ beliefs about their partners’ propensity to cooperate will differ from non-CSR
investors.
In summary, the extant literature on CSR and the labor markets suggests that disclosure
of CSR investment is an effective mechanism to motivate current employees and attract desirable
employees. I build on this stream of research by examining whether disclosure of CSR
investment is also an effective mechanism to facilitate cooperation between managers from
separate organizations working in a business collaboration. Next, I discuss the relevant literature
on CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and the capital markets.
2.1.2. CSR and capital markets
Recent archival studies in accounting provide evidence that CSR investment and
disclosure can reduce information asymmetry in capital markets. CSR disclosure is associated
with a lower cost of capital, improved analyst forecast precision, and reduced negative shocks to
12

stock price (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that CSR
disclosure is positively associated with the cost of equity capital in the prior year and negatively
associated with the cost of equity capital in the subsequent year. The authors’ findings are
consistent with the notion that managers disclose CSR in an effort to provide information about
long-term sustainability to investors to reduce the cost of equity capital.
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) examine the relationship between CSR disclosure and analyst
forecast accuracy across 31 countries. The authors find that CSR disclosure increases
transparency and is associated with greater financial analysts forecast accuracy. The increase in
analyst forecast precision following CSR disclosure is stronger in more stakeholder oriented
countries, where managers are more influenced by non-shareholder constituents such as
employees, consumers, and communities. Findings from Dhaliwal et al. (2011; 2012) suggest
that disclosure of CSR investment provides incremental information to shareholders and
financial intermediaries. Consistent with stakeholder theory, results from Dhaliwal (2012)
suggest that managers’ CSR disclosure and investment decisions are influenced by nonshareholder constituents.
Dhaliwal et al. (2011; 2012) measure CSR disclosure as the issuance of a voluntary
stand-alone electronic or hard-copy CSR report. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) control for CSR
investment based on third-party, CSR performance ratings from the KLD STATS database. KLD
STATS is a data set with annual ratings of the environmental, social, and governance
performance of U.S. companies. Starting from 1991, KLD STATS rated approximately 650
companies every year. KLD expanded its coverage to include the largest 1,000 U.S. companies
in 2001 and the largest 3,000 U.S. companies in 2003, based on market capitalization. KLD
STATS provides strength and concern ratings from multiple indicators along seven dimensions:
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corporate governance, community relations, diversity, employee relations, environment, human
rights in non-U.S. operations, and product. In addition, KLD STATS also issues concern ratings
for companies with operations in the alcohol, gambling, tobacco, firearms, military contracting,
and nuclear power industries. There is variation in how CSR investment is measured using the
KLD STATS data set. However, a widely accepted methodology is to create a CSR Score by
calculating total strengths less total concerns in KLD’s five social dimensions: community,
diversity, employee relations, environment, and product (Johnson and Greening 1999; Chatterji
et al. 2009).
Archival evidence also suggests that managers who invest in CSR are fiscally responsible
(Kim et al. 2012; Hoi et al. 2013). Kim et al. (2012) find that CSR investment is linked to higher
earnings quality. CSR firms are less likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals,
manipulate real operating activities, or be subject of an SEC investigation (Kim et al. 2012).
Further, findings suggest that there is an inverse relationship between CSR investment and tax
aggressiveness (Hoi et al. 2013). Managers who engage in irresponsible CSR activities are more
likely to engage in tax-sheltering activities, have greater discretionary/permanent book-tax
differences, more uncertain tax positions, and their tax positions are likely supported by weaker
facts and circumstances. These results are consistent with the notion that CSR investment is
indicative of organizational culture and values which permeate managerial decision making
across various domains. Kim et al. (2012) and Hoi et al. (2013) measure CSR investment based
on KLD STATS ratings. Given the research questions, neither study examines CSR disclosure,
either in terms of a stand-alone CSR report or integrated CSR disclosure within financial reports.
Lys et al. (2015) find that disclosure of CSR investment is a credible signal of future firm
performance. The authors posit that managers’ are more likely to invest in CSR when they
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expect strong future performance, as they expect to have greater operational slack to take on
special projects. Namely, the positive correlation between current CSR investment and change in
return on assets and change in cash flow from operations are due to an omitted variable,
managers’ private information about future performance.
Lys et al. (2015) measure CSR investment and CSR disclosure for approximately 6,000
firm-year observations from 2002 until 2010. CSR investment is calculated based on evaluations
from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database which provides comprehensive CSR data for firms
in the Russell 1000. ASSET4 provides environmental, social, and governance information on
over 250 key performance indicators and over 750 data points per firm for over 5,000
companies. The primary measure of CSR investment used by Lys et al. (2015) is the CSR Score
produced by ASSET4, which includes social and environmental factors and excludes financial
performance or corporate governance factors. The authors also use two alternate specifications of
the CSR Score that either only include social factors or environmental factors. Lys et al. (2015)
measure CSR disclosure using three separate CSR disclosure definitions, (1) whether a company
issues a stand-alone CSR report, (2) whether the CSR report is audited by ASSET4, and (3)
whether the CSR report uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework, a set of
standardized guidelines that enable greater transparency on environmental and social
performance.
Despite the growing body of research on CSR in accounting, the empirical evidence of an
association between CSR and firm performance is inconclusive. In a recent review of CSR
accounting literature published over the past decade in 13 top accounting journals, Huang and
Watson (2015) cite three main reasons why evidence of a link between CSR and performance is
mixed. First, viewing CSR from a shareholder wealth-maximizing perspective can be difficult. It
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is important to understand the determinants of CSR, which vary for firms and will affect the
CSR-performance link (Moser and Martin 2012). For instance, if firms invest in CSR for nonwealth maximizing reasons, such as managerial altruism or in response to stakeholder
preferences for societal benefits, there would be a potential negative CSR-performance relation
(Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Martin and Moser 2016).
Second, both CSR and performance are multi-dimensional constructs that are difficult to
capture using archival data (Huang and Watson 2015; Chandler 2017). Further, CSR investment
differs dramatically across firms. The datasets archival researchers rely upon to measure CSR
use different methodologies to measure CSR investment and have a very low degree of
correlation, ranging from 0.13 to 0.52, which suggests low convergent validity (Chatterji et al.
2015). 2 In addition, studies tend to measure the effect of CSR on outcomes such as share price
variability or short-term profitability, both of which may not be suitable outcome measures for
CSR investment which often involves multi-period, long-term capital investments (e.g.
converting a production facility from fossil fuel to solar). However, a meta-analysis of 52 studies
finds that CSR investment is more highly correlated with ROE and ROA, accounting-based
measures of performance, than with share price, a market-based measure of performance
(Orlitzky et al. 2016).
Third, evidence suggests that there may be a fundamental endogenity problem when
examining the effect of CSR investment on performance (Huang and Watson 2015). Recent
research suggests that there may be a reverse causality between CSR investment and
performance; such that CSR investment is a consequence, rather than a determinant, of financial
performance (Lys et al. 2015).

2

Chatterji et al. (2015) measure the correlation among six major social raters, KLD STATS, ASEET4, Calvert,
FTSE4Good, DJSI, and Innovest.
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I propose an experimental investigation into a potential performance benefit of CSR
investment and disclosure that is difficult to isolate using archival data. In particular, I examine
the links between CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and cooperation among managers in
business collaborations. While each methodology has its strengths and weaknesses, a benefit of
using experimental methodology is that it builds on the existing archival research while avoiding
many of the drawbacks described above (Huang and Watson 2015; Moser and Martin 2012;
Peteraf 1993). First, it avoids the issues of measuring CSR using low validity measures. Second,
it allows for control of potential reverse causation between CSR and performance. Third, I am
able to examine how a construct that is difficult to identify using archival data, managerial
motives for investing in CSR, affects cooperation in collaborative environments. Fourth, using a
controlled experiment allows me to isolate CSR investment from CSR disclosure to examine the
potential moderating effect of CSR disclosure on the link between CSR investment and
cooperation in business collaborations. Lastly, in a laboratory environment cooperation between
business collaboration partners, is observable. In the real world, it if often difficult, if not
impossible to determine whether partners cooperate.
Next, I discuss recent experimental accounting studies that examine how CSR investment
and disclosure impact shareholders. Experimental evidence suggests that CSR disclosure leads to
greater investment and improved stock valuations (Elliott et al. 2014; Martin and Moser 2016).
Elliott et al. (2014) find that investors incorporate CSR disclosure information into their
estimates of firms’ fundamental value. Positive CSR performance information results in higher
estimates of fundamental value, while negative CSR performance information leads to lower
estimates of fundamental value. Interestingly, the magnitude of this effect is significantly
diminished when investors explicitly attend to CSR disclosures. The authors conclude that CSR
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disclosures may unintentionally influence estimates of fundamental value when investors do not
explicitly assess CSR performance information.
In a related study, Martin and Moser (2016) examine a setting in which managers make a
CSR investment decision and a voluntary CSR disclosure decision. Findings indicate that
investors respond favorably to disclosure of CSR investment, even when it has a negative impact
on future cash flows. Martin and Moser (2016) posit that managers’ invest in CSR and disclose
CSR in response to investors’ preferences for CSR. My study is similar to Martin and Moser
(2016) in that I also examine CSR investment and disclosure. However, in my study CSR
disclosure is exogenous. While this is an abstraction, it allows me to measure the effect of CSR
disclosure independent of CSR investment. Further, I extend their study by examining the effects
of CSR investment and disclosure on a different stakeholder constituent, business collaboration
partners.
2.1.3. Credibility of CSR
As discussed earlier, CSR investment and disclosure reduces information asymmetry in
labor markets and capital markets. CSR disclosure can act as a signal to current and potential
employees about the culture and values of the organization leading to greater employee
motivation and cooperation among current employees, enabling firms to attract potential
employees (e.g. Greening and Turban 2000; Brekke and Nyborg 2008; Balakrishnan et al. 2011).
Further, CSR investment is associated with higher earnings quality (Kim et al. 2012) and
conservative tax policy (Hoi et al. 2013). In addition, CSR investment and disclosure is
associated with lower cost of capital, improved analyst forecast precision, reduced negative
shocks to stock price (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012), and higher future financial
performance (Lys et al. 2015).
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However, among investors, customers, popular press, and academics there is a great deal
of cynicism and skepticism regarding the sincerity of CSR investment and the credibility of CSR
disclosure (Pope and Waeraas 2016). Many believe that firms are profiting from insincere claims
of CSR and the terms “green-washing” and “CSR-washing” are becoming increasingly
commonplace (Mattis 2008). Results from domestic and international surveys consistently
suggest that consumers believe that CSR investment and disclosure are undertaken superficially
as the basis for marketing campaigns (Katz 2008; Kanter 2009).
A salient example of “CSR-washing” is the recent Volkswagen scandal. In 2015 it was
revealed that Volkswagen intentionally installed software in 11 million diesel-powered vehicles.
As a result of the scandal, Volkswagen agreed to either repurchase the “dirty” diesel cars sold in
the U.S. or give cash payouts to owners who would prefer to have their vehicles fixed. To date
the scandal has cost the automaker $30 billion (Riley 2017). Meanwhile, the firm’s 2014
sustainability report painted a very different picture of the firm. Volkswagen stated their strategic
goal was to be the most sustainable automotive company in the world by integrating climate risk,
resource scarcity, digitization, and social equity into its corporate strategy (The Volkswagen
Group 2014). While the Volkswagen scandal is an extreme case, it is not uncommon for firms to
misrepresent their CSR investments. In 2009, EasyJet claimed air travel on one of their planes
had a smaller carbon footprint than driving a Toyota Prius hybrid car (Pearce 2009). In 2005
British Airways began a highly publicized campaign to offset carbon emissions. Two years later
the airline admitted to offsetting less than 0.1% of the 27 million tons of emissions produced
during the two-year campaign (Davies 2007).
While firms often engage in questionable CSR investment and misleading CSR
disclosure, a substantial number of firms fully integrate CSR investment and disclosure into their
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strategy and operations. For these firms, CSR disclosure is a reliable representations of
organizational culture and values. For instance, at that at the other end of the spectrum from
Volkswagen are socially conscious firms like Toms Footwear and Patagonia. Toms Footwear
was founded on the principle of socially conscious capitalism, pioneering the buy one / give one
business model. For each pair of shoes Toms Footwear sells, the firm donates a pair to children
in need. To date, the company has given away more than 75 million pairs of new shoes.
Patagonia, an environmentally conscious clothing brand for outdoor enthusiasts fully integrates
sustainability into their business model. For instance, in November, 2016 the company donated
100% of their $10 million Black Friday sales to grass roots organizations that benefit the
environment. The firm integrates social responsibility into their supply chain and uses organic,
pesticide-free cotton for their clothing. Patagonia even publishes books and produces films that
promote sustainability and environmental protection.
Given the nature of CSR investment, it is often difficult to determine, ex ante, whether
CSR disclosure is reliable. Thus, it is an open question as to whether or not disclosure of CSR
investment will act as a credible signal of managers’ preferences for cooperation. Next, I discuss
business collaborations, the setting in which I examine CSR investment and disclosure.
Business Collaborations
Rapidly changing and expanding global markets, deregulation, and technological
advancements have greatly increased competitive pressures. The current market conditions make
it difficult for firms to remain dominant by relying on internal competitive advantages (Ring and
Van De Ven 1992; Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Nooteboom 2004). Recent survey evidence finds
that 85% of respondents believe that business collaborations are essential for firm growth
(Business Performance Innovation Network 2014). One way for firms to prosper in the hyper20

competitive, dynamic marketplace is through business collaborations with other firms. Business
collaborations allow firms to remain nimble and adaptable by accessing complementary
strengths that would be too costly or time consuming to develop alone (Bleeke and Ernst 1995;
Groot and Merchant 2000; Inkpen and Ross 2001).
Business collaborations are organizational structures that fall between internalization (i.e.
internal development or merger and acquisition) and market exchange. Business collaborations
can take the form of a variety of cooperative arrangements, including enhanced supplier
relationships, technology exchanges, joint production, joint marketing and promotion,
distribution agreements, and research and development agreements (Alter and Hage 1993;
Anderson and Sedatole 2003; Das and Teng 2000). Strategy research suggests that firms seek a
strategic fit between their internal characteristics (strengths and weaknesses) and their external
environment (opportunities and threats) to maximize firm value. Both transaction cost economics
and the resource-based view of the firm provide explanations for how managers make these
ownership decisions.
In transaction cost economics, the organization is viewed as homogenous and ownership
decisions are seen as a function of the external environment. Managers’ organizational decisions
are based on minimizing the sum of transaction costs and production costs (Coase 1937; Parkhe
1993). Transaction costs are incurred from activities necessary for exchange, while production
costs are costs incurred from coordinating activities in-house, such as learning, organizing, and
managing production. Managers choose internalization when production costs are low and
transaction costs are high. Managers choose market exchange when production costs are high
and transaction costs are low. Business collaborations are sought when transaction costs and
production costs are intermediate.
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In transaction cost economics, a manager’s ownership decisions are viewed as a function
of cost minimization, while under the resource-based view of the firm, the ownership decision is
based on value maximization (Das and Teng 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Under
the resource-based view of the firm, organizations are heterogeneous and ownership decisions
are a function of the internal characteristics (Peteraf 1993). Valuable firm resources are usually
scarce, imperfectly imitable, and often lack direct substitutes. When resources cannot be
efficiently obtained through market exchange or internalization, managers must share or
exchange the resources via business collaboration. Market exchange may not be possible when
resources are mingled with other resources or embedded in organizations, and thus not perfectly
tradable. Internalization may not be feasible when redundant or unwanted resources are
comingled with valuable resources. Further, even when resources are separable, redundant
resources may not be able to be disposed of without a loss due to asset specificity. Consistent
with a resource-based view of the firm, business collaborations allows managers access to
precisely the resources that are needed, while minimizing redundant resources.
Based on a transaction cost economics and a resource-based view, the benefits of
business collaborations are that they allow partners to combine the technologies, skills,
relationships, and resources of each firm to reduce costs, mitigate strategic risk, expand scale,
and create access to new markets (Anderson and Sedatole 2003). However, despite these
benefits, approximately half of business collaborations fail (Gerwin 2004; Lunnan and Haugland
2008). Two well-known scholars in the area of business collaborations, T.K. Das and BingSheng Teng, identify two reasons for the high failure rate of business collaborations, relational
risk and performance risk.
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Relational risk refers to the risk that partners do not cooperate (Das and Teng 1998;
2000). One reason for the high rates of failure is that partners must invest significant levels of
physical or human capital and coordinate joint activities to be successful (Kanter 1994; Doz
1996). Das and Teng (1998, 492) define cooperation as “honest dealing, commitment, fair play,
and complying with agreements.” Non-cooperation “is exemplified by cheating, shirking,
distorting information, misleading partners, providing substandard products or services, and
appropriating partners' critical resources” (Das and Teng 1998, 492). Given business
collaborations involve partnerships across separate firms, it is difficult for firms to anticipate,
monitor, and compel cooperation. This is an important issue, since cooperation can be difficult to
achieve in business collaborations because there is tension between a manager’s desire to pursue
her own self-interest and her desire to cooperate.
Aside from relational risk, there are several factors that may negatively affect business
collaboration performance. Collectively, these factors are referred to as performance risk.
Performance risk encompasses strategic risk faced by all firms and is not unique to business
collaborations. Performance risk is due to factors such as intensified rivalry, new substitutes or
market entrants, shifts in demand, unfavorable regulatory policies, or lack of partner competence
(Das and Teng 2001). While performance risk is an important issue faced by all firms, the focus
of this study is relational risk, which is unique to business collaborations. In particular, explore
of whether disclosure of CSR investment mitigates relational risk and facilitates cooperation in
business collaborations.
Internal Controls
Management accountants help to design and implement formal control systems to
facilitate operational and strategic initiatives (Horngren et al. 2015). Formal control systems
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include explicit mechanisms and procedures such as profit planning, capital budgeting, and
performance measurement and evaluation. Informal control systems are unwritten and implicit,
and are comprised of shared norms, culture, values, and group identification. While management
accountants are mainly tasked with formal control systems, it is important for management
accountants to be cognizant of informal controls systems. This is because formal and informal
control systems often have an interactive effect on managerial behavior and decision making
(Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Kelly and Presslee 2017). Further, formal control systems can affect
informal control systems (Coletti et al. 2005; Mulder et al. 2006).
While my study is focused on interfirm cooperation in a collaborative environment, it is
worth noting that informal controls, in the form of team identity, can be useful in facilitating
cooperation in intrafirm environments (Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Kelly and Presslee 2017).
Using a modified prisoner’s dilemma strategic interaction task, Towry (2003) examines the
interactive effects of formal controls (i.e. monitoring) and informal controls (i.e. team identity)
on communication and effort in work teams. Strong team identity is found to enhance
communication in work teams. Under a formal peer-to-peer monitoring system, communication
facilitates cooperation and enhances effort. However, under a formal peer-to-supervisor
monitoring system, communication facilitates collusion and erodes effort. Results suggest that
the efficacy of formal control systems may be dependent upon informal controls.
Kelly and Presslee (2017) also examine the interactive effects of formal controls and
informal controls on work team performance. The authors examine performance on a decoding
task in four-person groups under a small winner proportion tournament versus large winner
proportion tournament. In the small winner proportion tournament the top performer wins a large
reward. In the large winner proportion tournament the top three performers win small rewards.
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An informal control, group identity, is manipulated as either strong or moderate. A slogan
guessing game was used to create a strong (moderate) group identity. Prior to the experimental
task, all participants in a session competed in a slogan guessing game. In the strong group
identity treatment, manipulated between sessions, participants were first assigned to their groups
and played as a group against other participant-groups. Participants remained in the same groups
during the experimental task. In the moderate group identity treatment, participants competed
individually in the slogan guessing game against all other individual participants in the
experimental session. After completing the slogan guessing game, participants were then
assigned to groups for the experimental task. Results indicate that strong group identity increases
other-regarding preferences which is negatively associated with competitiveness which decreases
performance, and this effect is stronger under the large winner proportion tournament versus the
small winner proportion tournament. In summary, increasing group identity has a detrimental
effect on performance under the large winner proportion tournament, but not under the small
winner proportion tournament.
Experimental evidence suggest that informal control systems can have a positive, additive
effect on formal control systems (Rowe 2004). Cooperation is highest in cross-functional teams
when formal controls and informal controls both reinforce team identity. Participants in fourperson work teams were either provided with unit-level accounting reports that only report
individual payoffs or with process-level accounting reports that summarize payoffs for all four
team members. Further, team structure was manipulated as either distributed, where each
member was located in a separate room or face-to-face where team members sat at the same
table. No communication was permitted in either treatment. Cross-functional work team
cooperation is highest when work teams receive process-level reports in a face-to-face team
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structure. The combination of team-focused accounting reports and face-to-face structure leads to
higher levels of trust which is positively associated with collectivism which increases
cooperation.
Research provides mixed evidence regarding the effect of formal controls on cooperation
in business collaborations. Colletti et al. (2005) find that formal control systems encourage
cooperation in business collaborations by enhancing trust among work partners. The authors
conduct a psychology-based experiment in which a participant, in the role of manager, reads a
scenario and either cooperates and makes a hypothetical investment in a joint project or does not
cooperate and a makes a hypothetical investment in an individual project. In the formal control
system treatment, a consultant can make an unannounced visit. If the consultant determines the
manager underinvested in the joint project, the manager is penalized. In the no formal control
system treatment, there is no monitoring or penalty for underinvestment into the joint project. In
the presence of a formal control system, managers are more cooperative. Further, the formal
control system enhances the informal control system. Observers rate the managers in the formal
control system treatment as more trustworthy than managers in the no formal control system
treatment. In the second experiment, the authors employ a repeated prisoner’s dilemma task to
operationalize the business collaboration setting. Managers decide whether or not to cooperate
by either investing in the joint project or in the individual project. Again, in the formal control
system treatment a consultant may make an unannounced visit. If the manager contributed to the
joint project she receives a bonus. In the no formal control system treatment, there is no
monitoring. After 20 rounds, the formal control system is removed. The authors find that
cooperation and trust are greater under the formal control system even after monitoring is
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removed. Similar to first experiment, the formal control system enforced the informal control
system and facilitated a culture of trust and cooperation.
However, it is not clear whether formal control systems enhance or erode trust. Mulder et
al. (2006) find that formal control systems erode trust. Mulder et al. (2006) perform a series of
experiments using a modified four-person public goods task, similar to the one described in
Brekke et al. (2011) to measure cooperation and trust in work teams. Findings indicate that a
formal control system that penalizes non-cooperation erodes trust. Although cooperation is
higher under the formal control system, trust in others is lower. Individuals are more suspicious
of their partners’ motivation for cooperating and have less trust that others are internally
motivated to cooperate.
In a business collaboration where partner output is unobservable and difficult to enforce,
it is not cost effective to rely on formal control systems to encourage cooperation. I examine
whether disclosure of CSR investment can act as a mechanism to foster cooperation by
enhancing managers’ belief that their partner is internally motivated to cooperate. This issue is
related to research that examines whether managers who share the same organizational culture
are more likely to cooperate in business collaborations. Next, I discuss the relevant findings from
this stream of literature.
Organizational culture primarily relates to common beliefs and norms in organizational
practices and behaviors (Hofstede et al. 1990; Pothukuchi et al. 2002). Cultural differences
between organizational partners is a major factor that can influence the outcome of a business
collaboration (Cartwright and Cooper 1993; Weber et al. 1996). For example, Pothukuchi et al.
(2002) conclude that organizational culture is more important than national culture in
determining joint venture success between Indian and non-Indian firms. Further, in a study of 52
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mergers and acquisitions from the mid-1980s, Weber et al. (1996) find that a mismatch in
organizational culture negatively influences cooperation among top managers.
Organizational culture can affect cooperation in business collaborations through three
avenues. First, organizational culture affects tenure and promotion decisions, resulting in a
skewed set of managers who are responsible for collaborations (Hambrick et al. 2001). Second,
individuals prefer to work for a firm where there is a congruence between their own beliefs and
values and the firm’s espoused culture, norms, and values (Morley 2007). Third, an
organizational culture serves to reinforce and communicate the set of managerial behaviors that
are appropriate, expected, and rewarded and the set of managerial behaviors that are
inappropriate, frowned upon, and punished.
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Hypotheses are developed based on theoretical and empirical evidence from the CSR,
business collaboration, and internal control literatures. Hypotheses 1 and 2 examine the effect of
CSR disclosure on managers’ CSR investment and cooperation choices. Hypotheses 3 and 4
compare cooperation across business collaborations dependent on managers’ CSR investment
choices, controlling for CSR disclosure.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that CSR investment is higher when CSR is disclosed than when
CSR is not disclosed. In a setting in which CSR investment is not disclosed there are no potential
signaling benefits to facilitate cooperation among partners. Thus, managers’ only motivation for
investing in CSR can be explained by individual preferences for CSR. However, when CSR is
disclosed managers may invest in CSR for two non-mutually exclusive reasons. First, they may
invest in CSR due to preferences for CSR. Second, managers may invest in CSR to signal their
willingness to cooperate to their business collaboration partners. Even though CSR investment is
costly, managers are better off investing in CSR when the incremental benefit from increased
cooperation exceeds the incremental cost of CSR investment. Thus, when CSR is disclosed a
sub-set of managers who do not have preferences for CSR may choose to invest in CSR as a
mechanism to facilitate cooperation.
However, it is not entirely clear whether CSR disclosure will lead to higher levels of CSR
investment. Managers may not view CSR investment as a credible signal of preferences for
cooperation. Further, CSR disclosure could inhibit CSR investment among managers who have
preferences for CSR, but do not want to appear as though they are investing in CSR for self29

serving reasons. In other words, CSR disclosure may impede CSR investment among managers
who would prefer to invest in CSR when the investment cannot be used for their economic
benefit. Despite the uncertainty regarding the effect of CSR disclosure on CSR investment, I
predict that the motivating effects of CSR disclosure will outweigh any potential mitigating
effects on CSR investment. This leads to the first hypothesis, stated as follows.

H1:

CSR investment is higher when CSR is disclosed versus when CSR is not
disclosed.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that managers are more cooperative when CSR is disclosed than
when CSR is not disclosed. As discussed in the literature review, informal control systems are
unwritten and implicit, and are comprised of shared norms, culture, values, and group
identification. In a business collaboration where partner input is unobservable and difficult to
enforce, it is not cost effective to rely solely on formal control systems to encourage cooperation
(Das and Teng 1998). Empirical evidence suggests that informal controls can facilitate intrafirm
cooperation (Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Kelly and Presslee 2017). Further, evidence from field
studies suggests that informal controls in the form of shared values among managers is a major
factor that can influence the outcome of business collaborations (Cartwright and Cooper 1993;
Weber et al. 1996).
Cooperation in business collaborations involves risk, as a partner can act
opportunistically and it is difficult to use formal control mechanisms to compel cooperation (Das
and Teng 1998). Thus, cooperation in a business collaboration is a function of both a managers’
preference for cooperation as well as her beliefs about her partner’s willingness to cooperate. I
posit that disclosure of CSR investment is a credible signal regarding a manager’s propensity to
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cooperate. Thus, CSR disclosure reduces uncertainty regarding a partners’ preference for
cooperation and facilitates cooperation. This leads to the second hypothesis, stated as follows:

H2:

Cooperation in business collaborations is higher when CSR is disclosed versus
when CSR is not disclosed.

Next, I examine cooperation in business collaborations when CSR is disclosed. Given
cooperation in business collaborations involves risk but is mutually beneficially, a manager is
likely to cooperate with a partner she believes will also cooperate. Prior studies posit that
managers who invest in CSR are other-regarding and have a preference for cooperation (Brekke
and Nyborg 2008; Brekke et al. 2011). However, in these studies CSR investment is always
disclosed. Consistent with the prior literature, I posit that CSR investors have a preference for
cooperation conditional on the belief that their partner also has a preference for cooperation. This
is because cooperation in business collaborations involves risk, as a partner can act
opportunistically and it is difficult to use formal control mechanisms to compel cooperation (Das
and Teng 1998). Thus, cooperation in a business collaboration is a function of both a managers’
preference for cooperation as well as her beliefs about her partner’s willingness to cooperate. I
posit that disclosure of CSR investment is a credible signal regarding a manager’s propensity to
cooperate. Thus, managers who invest in CSR are more likely to cooperate conditional on CSR
disclosure.
I argue that disclosure of CSR investment may or may not be indicative of one’s otherregarding preferences, but it is a credible signal of one’s cooperativeness. Thus, I predict that a
manager who invests in CSR will revise her beliefs about their partner’s likelihood of
cooperating dependent on her partner’s CSR investment choice, and adapt her behavior
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accordingly. Given CSR investment is disclosed, a CSR investor is more likely to cooperate with
a CSR investor than with a Non-CSR investor.
However, it is not clear whether a Non-CSR investor will behave differently when she is
partnered with a CSR investor versus a Non-CSR investor when CSR is disclosed. In Non-CSR
investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations, managers may view CSR investment as a dead cost
and see themselves and their partners as wealth maximizers. Given that cooperation is wealth
maximizing, Non-CSR investors may be more cooperative when partnered with Non-CSR
investors than when partnered with CSR investors. Alternatively, Non-CSR investors may view
CSR investors as more cooperative in general, versus conditionally cooperative, and may be
more likely to cooperate when partnered with a CSR investor. 3 In this setting, it is not clear how
Non-CSR investors will behave when partnered with Non-CSR investors versus CSR investors.
The CSR investment choice results in the following four potential Manger 1 / Manager 2
collaborations: CSR investor / CSR investor, CSR investor / Non-CSR investor, Non-CSR
investor / CSR investor, and Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor. Hypothesis 3 compares the
level of cooperation in CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations relative to the other three
collaborations, as follows.

H3:

When CSR is disclosed, cooperation in business collaborations is highest when
both managers invest in CSR.

Next, I examine a setting in which CSR investment is not disclosed. Prior studies posit
that managers who invest in CSR are other-regarding and have a preference for cooperation

3

Using backward induction, if a Non-CSR investor believes CSR investors are conditionally cooperative, she will
not cooperate with a CSR investor. Suppose the Non-CSR Investor expects a CSR investor to cooperate when
partnered with a CSR investor and to not cooperate when partnered with a Non-CSR investor. Then the best
strategy is for a Non-CSR investor to not cooperate when partnered with a CSR investor.
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(Brekke and Nyborg 2008; Brekke et al. 2011). However, in these studies CSR investment is
always disclosed. I posit that a CSR investor is no more cooperative than a Non-CSR investor in
the absence of CSR disclosure. As explained in the discussion of Hypothesis 3, in a business
collaboration, a manager’s decision to cooperate is jointly determined by her preference for
cooperation and by her beliefs about his partner’s cooperativeness. Based on the notion that CSR
investors are conditional cooperators, in the absence of CSR disclosure I do not expect that CSR
investors will be more likely to cooperate than Non-CSR investors. This leads to the final
hypothesis, stated as follows.

H4:

When CSR is not disclosed, managers who invest in CSR are no more likely to
cooperate in business collaborations than managers who do not invest in CSR.

Combined, the hypotheses predict the following pattern of results. CSR disclosure is
predicted to increase CSR investment and cooperation among business collaboration partners.
Further, CSR disclosure is predicted to moderate the link between CSR investment and
cooperation in business collaborations. When CSR is disclosed, cooperation is predicted to be
higher among CSR investors / CSR investors business collaborations. However, when CSR is
not disclosed, CSR investors are not predicted to be more cooperative than non-CSR investors.
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4. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
Experimental Design
A 2 (CSR Disclosure) x 2 (CSR Investment) x 4 (Part) x 10 (Round) mixed factorial
design is employed to test the hypotheses. CSR Disclosure (Disclosure/Non-Disclosure) is
manipulated between participants and held constant across all four parts. CSR Investment (CSR
Investment/Non-CSR Investment) is a measured variable, measured at the start of each of the
four parts. The experiment is repeated for 40 rounds with random assignment after each round,
divided into four parts of ten rounds each. Thus, Part and Round are within-subject factors.
The purpose of this study is to explore the signaling effect of CSR disclosure. Thus, I control for
reputation, a potential confound, with random assignment after each round.
Stag Hunt Task
I operationalize a business collaboration as a strategic interaction using the stag hunt task
in which two managers simultaneously make decisions whether they will cooperate or not
cooperate. This methodology builds on prior experimental accounting research that uses strategic
interaction tasks to examine cooperation in business collaborations and work teams (e.g. Towry
2003; Rowe 2004; Coletti et al. 2005). As illustrated in Figure 1, managers’ earnings are jointly
determined by the simultaneous choice of whether to cooperate or not cooperate. If both
managers cooperate, they each earn 7 francs. 4 If both managers do not cooperate, they each earn

4

Throughout experiment, earnings are expressed in experimental currency termed francs. Participants are informed
that francs will be converted to cash at a rate of two francs to one US dollar.
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5 francs. If one manager cooperates and the other does not, the cooperator earns 0 francs and the
non-cooperator earns 5 francs. Thus, non-cooperators are guaranteed to earn 5 francs, regardless
of their partners’ choice. However, cooperators earn either 7 francs or 0 francs, depending on
their partners’ choice. The stag hunt payouts provides strategic tension. On one hand, a
manager’s highest payoff occurs when she cooperates and her partner also cooperates. On the
other hand, a manager’s lowest payoff occurs when she cooperates and her partner does not.
Manager 2
Cooperate

Not Cooperate

Cooperate

7,7

0,5

Not Cooperate

5,0

5, 5

Manager 1

Figure 1: Stag Hunt Earnings
Earnings are expressed in experimental currency termed francs. Earnings are converted to US Dollars at an
exchange rate of two francs to one US Dollar.

The payout structure in the stag hunt task represents the fundamental aspects of a
business collaboration. First, managers can either cooperate and expend resources towards joint
production or not cooperate and expend resources towards individual production. Second, due to
synergies, the sum of joint production exceeds the sum of individual production. 5 Third, a
necessary condition for successful joint production is that both managers cooperate. Thus, if a
manager invests resources to cooperate and her partner does not, her return is zero. In summary,
a manager either maximizes or minimizes her return when she cooperates dependent on her
partner’s choice.

5

The sum of joint production, 14 francs (7 francs + 7 francs), exceeds the sum of individual production, 10 francs
(5 francs + 5 francs).
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Given the payout structure in the stag hunt task, cooperation is jointly determined by each
manager’s preference for cooperation as well as her beliefs about her partner’s preference for
cooperation. Suppose Manager 1 believes her partner (Manager 2) will cooperate with
probability p, and not cooperate with probability 1 – p. Manager 1’s payoff from cooperation is
7p + 0(1 – p) = 7p. Manager 1’s payoff from non-cooperation is 5p + 5(1 – p) = 5. Manager 1 is
indifferent between cooperation and non-cooperation when the payoffs from both options are
equal; in other words when 7p = 5 or p = 5/7. Thus, Manager 1 will cooperate when she believes
the probability Manager 2 will cooperate, p is greater than 5/7, and Manager 1 will not cooperate
when p is less than 5/7. Since the payoffs are symmetrical, Manager 2 will also cooperate when p
is greater than 5/7, and not cooperate when p is less than 5/7.
Language throughout the experiment is kept neutral. Using non-contextual labels
mitigates demand effects from roleplaying or hypothesis guessing while maintaining the strategic
tensions present in actual business collaborations (Bowlin et al. 2015). As detailed in the
experimental instrument in Appendix A and the screen shots in Appendix B, all participants view
the game through the perspective of Player 1, labeled “Me.” A participant’s partner, Player 2, is
labeled “Partner”. As described in Figure 2, the main dependent variable Cooperatei,r is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not cooperate) in
round r. The terms cooperation and non-cooperation are never used in the experiment.
Participants either chose “Top” or “Bottom” and after each round, participants are informed
whether their partner chose “Left” or “Right.”
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Variable Name

Variable Definition

Altruismi

Ranges in value from 20 to 100. Higher values represent greater levels
of altruism;

AltruismDumi

A indicator variable equal to one if participant i’s score is greater than
the mean (median) score for Altruismi, and zero otherwise;

CharitySatisfactioni

Ranges in value from one to four. Higher values represent greater
satisfaction with the charity options;

Cooperatei,r

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to
cooperate (not cooperate) in round r, where r = (1, 2, 3…, 40);

CooperateCounti,

Ranges in value from zero to 40. Number of times participant i chooses
to cooperate across 40 rounds;

CSRInvesti,t

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to
donate (not donate) to charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3, 4);

CSRInvestCounti

Ranges in value from zero to four. Number of times participant i
chooses to donate to charity across four parts;

CSRPreferencei

Ranges in value from one to ten. Higher values represent stronger
preferences for corporate social responsibility;

CSRValuesi

Ranges in value from one to 15. Higher values represent more positive
beliefs regarding people who donate to charity;

CSRValuesDumi

A indicator variable equal to one if participant i’s score is greater than
the mean (median) score for CSRValuesi, and zero otherwise;

Disclosurei

Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is randomly
assigned to the Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) treatment;

PartnerCSRInvest-i,t An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if a participant’s partner -i
chooses to donate (not donate) to charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3, 4);
Prosociali

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is classified as
prosocial (proself);

Genderi

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant is female (male);

Riski

Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences
for greater risk;

Sessioni

A class variable that ranges in value from A to D. Participants in
Sessions A and B (C and D) were randomly assigned to the Disclosure
(Non-Disclosure) treatment.

Figure 2: Variable Definitions
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Participants
Undergraduate students from a private university who voluntarily chose to participate
were recruited for a single experimental session. A maximum of twenty-four participants were
recruited for each experimental session. The participant pool is similar to prior literature using a
strategic interaction task (e.g. Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Bogaert et al. 2008). I also follow prior
literature and use student participants as proxies for managers (e.g. Coletti et al. 2005;
Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Martin and Moser 2016).
Procedures
The experiment was implemented in a computer lab using networked computers. At the
beginning of the experimental session, participants sat at individual computers with privacy
screens. I introduced myself, obtained verbal consent, and informed participants that if anyone
had a question or an issue during the experimental session, to raise their hand. Throughout the
experimental session, I watched the participants from an adjoining room through one-sided glass.
Participants first read instructions about the experimental procedures. Participants were
informed that they will perform the stag hunt task for multiple rounds divided into four parts and
that they will remain anonymous throughout the entire experimental session. Further,
participants were informed of how their cash payout will be determined. Participants read the
instructions and completed an instruction quiz.
After completing the stag hunt task participants complete a virtual coin toss and a postexperimental questionnaire. At the start of each of the four parts, participants make a charity
donation choice, as described below. Participants are informed that if they provide an email
address the administrator will email a copy of the receipt for the charitable donations. This
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option is provided to reinforce to participants that the charities actually receive cash donations.
Lastly, participants receive their cash payouts and leave.
Charitable Donations
Consistent with prior experimental studies, CSR investment is operationalized as
charitable donation (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Brekke et al. 2011; Koppel and Regner 2014;
Martin and Moser 2016). A charitable donation was chosen to capture CSR investment for
several reasons. Charitable donations are recognized as a type of CSR in academia. To illustrate,
charitable donations are included in the Auld et. al (2008) taxonomy of seven categories of CSR.
Further, charitable donations have been used to capture CSR investment in various strategic
interaction settings, including a public goods task (Brekke et al. 2011), the gift exchange task
(Koppel and Regner 2014), and the trust task (Balakrishnan et al. 2011).
In practice, firms often donate resources to charity, either in the form of cash or through
gifts-in-kind. In order to gauge the frequency of corporate charitable donations among U.S.
companies, I examined charitable giving among the 2017 Fortune 100 companies. The Fortune
100 companies represent the 100 largest US corporations in terms of revenue and account for a
total of $7.4 trillion in revenue. For each Fortune 100 company I conducted an online search of
the company name and the term “charitable giving” and/or “charity donation.”
Of the Fortune 100 companies, 91% disclose some form of charitable giving on their
website. 6 Several firms have separate foundations that manage the organization’s charitable
giving. Common forms of charitable donations are employee matching programs, grants for nonprofits, long-term partnerships with non-profits, and emergency disaster relief. Firms that have

6

Freddie Mac, number 20 on the 2017 Fortune 100 list, is excluded from the analysis because their charitable
donation policy is regulated by the US Congress. Freddie Mac was placed into conservatorship by the federal
government in 2008 in response to the mortgage crisis.
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an employee matching program match employees’ charitable donations to qualifying non-profit
organizations up to a maximum amount. For example, Lockheed Martin matches employee
donations to colleges and universities up to $10,000 per year. In 2016 Boeing donated $18
million and Verizon donated $9.6 million to charities through their employee matching
programs.
The majority of Fortune 100 companies report that they provide funding to non-profits
through grant programs. For instance, in 2016 American Express provided $36 million in grants
to non-profits in leadership, historic preservation, and community services. Other companies
have developed long-term partnerships with national non-profits. Lowe’s has worked with
Habitat for Humanity for over a decade and report $20 million in cash and in-kind product
donations between 2003 and 2013. Several companies provide as-needed donations to charities
that provide disaster relief. For example, several companies donated to charities such as the Red
Cross in response to hurricanes Harvey and Irma which affected Texas, Louisiana, and Florida in
August and September of 2017. Delta Airlines, HCA Holdings, Marathon Petroleum, and Sysco
each donated $1 million and Apple donated $10 million to aid in response to hurricanes Harvey
and Irma.
It is worth noting that two of the nine companies that do not report charitable donations
on their websites are Berkshire Hathaway and Facebook. Berkshire Hathaway had a very unique
charitable giving program. Shareholders were allocated $8 per share to donate to the charity of
their choice. The program was terminated after a decade when various Berkshire Hathaway
subsidiaries were boycotted due to shareholders’ donations to charities with controversial
political views. However, Forbes calculates that Warren Buffett, the CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway has donated at least $9.5 billion of his own shares of Berkshire Hathaway to the Bill &
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Melinda Gates Foundation (Peterson-Withorn 2017). Similarly, Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of
Facebook has pledged that he will donate 99% of his net worth, approximately $45 billion, in his
lifetime (Brandom 2015).
While the overwhelming majority of large US corporations donate to charities, the level
of corporate charitable donations is relatively small. In 2015, total U.S. corporate donations of
$18.55 billion accounted for only 5% of all charitable donations and represent only 1.1% of
corporate after-tax profits (Giving USA Foundation 2017). I also measure the level of charitable
giving using the variable COM-str-A from the KLD STATS database. The variable COM-str-A is
equal to one if a company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings
before taxes to charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving. Between 20012010, the most recent 10-year time span with data for COM-str-A, 2.35% of company-year
observations indicate strong charitable giving. In summary, it appears as though the vast majority
of large US corporations include charitable donations as part of their CSR activities. However,
the overall level of charitable donations is relatively low. Given that relatively small charitable
donations are often used in practice, it is reasonable to expect that disclosure of a substantial
charitable donation would be interpreted as a credible form of CSR investment.
At the start of each part, participants chose whether or not to donate 10% of their cash
payout from that part to charity. Participants are informed that if they donate to charity the
amount will be doubled by the administrator. CSR investment is operationalized as a
dichotomous variable. This is an abstraction, as in the real world there is variation in the level of
charitable giving. The lack of variation in charitable donations limits the generalizability of the
results. However, the purpose of the study is to examine whether disclosure of CSR investment
is a credible signal of managers’ propensity to cooperate. Evidence suggests that higher levels of
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charitable donations are positively associated with stronger responses (Balakrishnan et al. 2011;
Koppel and Regner 2014; Martin and Moser 2016). In my experimental setting, CSR investment
is equal to the lowest level of charitable donations from prior studies, biasing away from finding
a result.
As shown in Figure 2 the main independent variables in the study are CSRInvesti,t and
PartnerCSRInvest-i,t. CSRInvesti,t is equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to donate (not
donate) to charity in part t. PartnerCSRInvest-i,t is equal to one (zero) if participant i’s partner –i
chooses to donate (not donate) to charity in part t.
If a participant chose to donate to charity she then selected one organization from the
following seven options: American Humane Association, American Red Cross, Amnesty
International, Habitat for Humanity, Sierra Club, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, and Wounded
Warrior Project. The options are visible to participants before they chose whether or not to
donate to charity. In addition, a brief description of each charity is provided. The charities were
selected to cover a wide variety of missions and service areas. The charities are highly ranked by
Charity Navigator and/or Charity Watch. Charity Navigator ranks over 8,000 non-profits based
on their financial health and their accountability and transparency. Charity Watch, formerly
known as the American Institute of Philanthropy, provides grade ratings and financial
performance measures for approximately 6,000 major U.S. charities and has been in operation
for over 25 years. The first five charities listed above were provided to participants in two pilot
studies. On average, participants in the two pilot studies rated their satisfaction with the five
charities as 3.40 out of four, with three indicating somewhat satisfied and four indicating very
satisfied. The Susan G. Komen for the Cure and Wounded Warrior Project were added to the list
of charities based on suggestions provided by participants in the two pilot studies.
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Two pilot studies were conducted using students from a from a private western university
who voluntarily choose to participate in a single experimental session. Participants in the pilot
studies had similar demographics to the participants in the main experiment. Participants from
the pilot studies were not eligible to participate in the further experimental sessions. The main
purpose of the pilot studies was to ensure the experimental task and methodologies were well
understood by the student participants. Further, data from the pilot studies was used to determine
if the charity options were satisfactory.
CSR Disclosure
The CSR disclosure environment is manipulated between participants at two levels,
Disclosure and Non-Disclosure. In the Disclosure treatment, participants are truthfully informed
of whether their partner invested in CSR or not. Participants are aware that their choice to donate
or not donate to charity will be communicated in every round to their partner via the label
“Donor” or “Non-Donor” next to “Partner” on the screen, as shown in Appendices A and B. In
the Non-Disclosure treatment, participants are not informed of whether their partner invested in
CSR. Participants in the Non-Disclosure treatment are aware that their charity donation choice
will not be communicated to their partners. In the Non-Disclosure treatment, the label “Donor”
or “Non-Donor” does not appear next to “Partner,” as shown in Appendices A and B. The
Disclosure treatment is manipulated between-participants. Thus, participants in the Disclosure
(Non-Disclosure) treatment, remain in the same treatment for the entire experimental session.
Similar to CSR investment, CSR disclosure is dichotomous. As described in Figure 2, the
independent variable Disclosurei is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is
randomly assigned to the Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) treatment. In the real world, there is a
substantial degree of variation in CSR disclosure. In the experimental laboratory, CSR disclosure
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manipulation is stark and simplified. The benefit of this simplification is that it controls for
myriad potential confounds.
Feedback
At the start of each of the four parts, participants choose whether or not to donate 10% of
their payout from that part to charity. Next, participants perform the stag hunt task for ten
rounds, with random assignment to another partner after each round. As shown in Appendix B,
the following information is provided at the end of each round in the History frame: part, round,
participant’s charity donation choice (i.e., Donor or Non-Donor), partner’s charity donation
choice (in the Disclosure treatment only), participant’s decision (i.e., Top or Bottom), partner’s
decision (i.e., Left or Right), francs earned by the participant, and francs earned by the
participant’s partner. Information is provided after each round and information for all rounds
played up to that point remains on the screen in the History frame.
Post Experimental Questionnaire and Payouts
A virtual coin flip based on Eckel and Grossman’s (2002) series of five 50/50 gambles is
used to elicit participants’ risk preferences. Empirical evidence suggests that while a simplified
risk preference measures are coarser than more cognitively difficult measures due to broader
categorization, they are less noisy (Chetan et al. 2010). Further, a simpler risk preference
measure has lower noise and equal predictive accuracy as a complex measure for low numeracy
individuals (Chetan et al. 2010). As shown in Appendices A and B, participants decide between
five gambles increasing in risk. Participants are then informed of the outcome of the virtual coin
flip and the points they’ve earned. Measuring risk preferences enables me to minimize the effect
of individual differences using the variable Riski, a covariate that ranges in value from one to five
based on the gamble selected. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk. Risk
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preferences are likely to affect behavior in the stag hunt task since cooperation involves risk,
while non-cooperation is riskless.
After completing the stag hunt task, participants provided demographic information (e.g.
age, gender, year). Participants then answer a two-item measure of CSR preferences and a threeitem measure of CSR values using a Likert scale from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly
agree). CSR preferences are measured with the following two items: Companies should take
actions to help society; I prefer to work for a company that takes actions to help society. The
variable CSRPreferencei is equal to the sum of the two CSR preference items and ranges in value
from one to ten, with higher values representing greater preferences for CSR. CSRPreferencei
was pre-tested in the two pilot studies and is highly correlated with CSR investment,
operationalized as a charity donation choice (r = 0.448, p = 0.002, not tabulated). CSR values are
measured with the following three items: I share the same values with people who donate to
charity; People who donate to charity care about others; People who donate to charity are
cooperative. CSRValuesi is equal to the sum of the three CSR values items and ranges in value
from one to fifteen, with higher values representing stronger beliefs regarding others who donate
to charity.
Participants completed two additional measures of individual differences. A nine-item
scale is used to measure social value orientation via a series of hypothetical payouts for oneself
and another person (Van Lange et al. 1997). Based on the responses, a dichotomous variable
Prosociali is calculated, where Prosociali is equal to one (zero) if the participant is classified as
prosocial (proself). A 20-item psychometric measure of altruism is administered (Rushton et al.
1981). Altruism is measured using a frequency scale from one (never) to five (very often) for 20
different activities, as shown in Appendix A. The variable Altruismi is equal to the sum of the 20
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Altruistic items and ranges in value from 20 to 100, with higher values representing stronger
altruism.
Participants are informed which round was randomly selected from each of the four parts
and their total payout is calculated. The cash payout amount is hyperlinked. If a participant clicks
on the hyperlink, they are provided with information about how much of their payout is from the
stag hunt task and how much is from the virtual coin flip. Participants are also informed of any
charity donation that will be made on their behalf. The charity donation amount is also
hyperlinked to provide detailed information on how the total charity donation is calculated. The
payout screen also includes the option for participants to provide an email address so they can
receive a copy of the receipt for the charitable donations. This option is provided to ensure
participants understand that charities will actually receive the donations.
At end of computerized experiment, the laboratory manager informed participants that
the experiment was complete and asked that they stay seated. The laboratory manager called
each participant by first name only and payed each participant in cash. After the experimental
sessions concluded, I made the online charity donations and emailed receipts to the participants
who provided an email address.
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5. RESULTS
Participants Demographics
Participants received a cash payout for their participation. On average, participants were
paid $18.12, including a $7.00 show-up fee for less than one hour of their time. The experiment
took an average of 37 minutes to complete. Participants in the Disclosure treatment earned an
average of $16.68. Participants in the No Disclosure treatment earned an average of $19.50.
In total, 94 students participated. There were 38 males (40.4 percent) and 56 females
(59.6 percent). Students were similar on background characteristics such as age, year, and
education. On average, they were 19.0 years old and had taken 3.2 college-level business and/or
economics courses. 35.1 percent were freshman, 42.6 percent were sophomores, 12.8 percent
were juniors, and 9.6 percent were seniors.
Instruction Comprehension and Manipulation Check
To ensure participants attended to the onscreen instructions, they were required to spend
at least 30 seconds on each of the nine instruction screens before they could proceed to the next
screen. Participants were then required to complete a quiz. One of the quiz questions contained
the following manipulation check question: In each round you will be able to see whether or not
your partner chose to donate to charity and your partner will be able to see whether or not you
chose to donate to charity. In the Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) treatment, the correct answer is
True (False). If participants answered a quiz question incorrectly, they were informed that the
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answer was incorrect, given a hint, and prompted to answer the question again. Participants were
required to answer all quiz questions correctly in order to proceed to the experimental task.
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire.
As part of the post-experimental questionnaire, participants rated the clarity of the instructions on
a scale of one (very confusing) to four (very clear). The mean instruction clarity rating is 3.83
out of four, indicating that on average, participants clearly understood the experimental
instructions.
Operationalization of CSR Investment
CSR Investment is operationalized as a donation to charity. Participants chose whether or
not to donate to charity at the start of Part One (rounds 1 – 10), Part Two (rounds 11 – 20), Part
Three (rounds 21 – 30), and Part Four (rounds 31 – 40). As explained in the experimental
methodology section, a charitable donation choice is used to capture the construct of CSR
investment. To test for construct validity, I examine whether CSRPreferencei, an individual
difference variable that measures preferences for CSR, is correlated with participants’ CSR
investment choice. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. CSRPreferencei ranges in value from
one to ten. As shown in Table 1, the mean value for CSRPreferencei is 8.60, indicating relatively
strong CSR preferences.
CSR investment is captured using the indicator variable CSRInvesti,t, an indicator variable
equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t, where t equals one
through four. CSRInvesti,t is converted from a dichotomous variable with one observation per
participant-round to CSRInvestCounti, a continuous variable with one observation per
participant. CSRInvestCounti is calculated by counting the number of times a participant chooses
to donate to charity in across Part One through Part Four. Thus, values for CSRInvestCounti
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Mean (sd)
Disclosure
Session

Non-Disclosure
Total

A

B

22

24

CSRInvestCounti

2.41 (1.76)

CooperateCounti

Session

Grand Total
Total

C

D

46

24

24

48

94

1.71 (1.60)

2.04 (1.70)

1.38 (1.50)

1.58 (1.50)

1.48 (1.49)

1.76 (1.61)

19.09 (10.18)

14.08 (8.48)

16.48 (9.57)

35.29 (4.86)

7.92 (4.30)

21.60 (14.56)

19.10 (12.57)

CSRPreferencei

8.91 (1.27)

8.54 (1.35)

8.72 (1.31)

8.42 (1.35)

8.54 (1.47)

8.48 (1.40)

8.60 (1.35)

CSRValuesi

10.73 (2.03)

10.83 (2.10)

10.78 (2.04)

10.88 (1.62)

10.38 (2.83)

10.63 (2.29)

10.70 (2.16)

Prosociali

0.73 (0.46)

0.79 (0.41)

0.76 (0.43)

0.63 (0.49)

0.67 (0.48)

0.65 (0.48)

0.70 (0.46)

Altruismi

54.23 (8.31)

54.96 (10.40)

54.61 (9.36)

51.21 (9.01)

52.63 (9.64)

51.92 (9.25)

53.23 (9.35)

Riski

2.68 (1.39)

2.71 (1.37)

2.70 (1.36)

3.21 (1.64)

2.83 (1.55)

3.02 (1.59)

2.86 (1.48)

Number of participants

Cash Payout indicates cash payment made to participants, including a $7.00 show-up fee.
Charity Donation indicates average charity donation amount made by participants who chose to donate to charity, including the administrator match.
Variable Definitions
Altruismi
CooperateCounti,r
CSRInvestCounti
CSRPreferencei
CSRValuesi
Prosociali
Riski

Ranges in value from 20 to 100. Higher values represent greater levels of altruism;
Ranges in value from zero to 40. Number of times participant i chooses to cooperate
across 40 rounds;
Ranges in value from zero to four. Number of times participant i chooses to donate to
charity across four parts;
Ranges in value from one to ten. Higher values represent stronger preferences for
corporate social responsibility;
Ranges in value from one to 15. Higher values represent more positive beliefs
regarding people who donate to charity;
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is classified as prosocial
(proself);
Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk.
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range from zero to four, with higher values representing more frequent CSR investment. As
reported in Table 1, participants donate to charity an average of 1.76 out of four times. Spearman
rank correlation coefficients are reported in Table 2. Results suggest that individual preferences
for CSR are positively correlated with CSR investment (r = 0.265, p = 0.010), indicating that the
choice to donate to charity is a reasonable proxy for CSR investment. 7
Participants rated their satisfaction with the charity options on a scale of one (very
dissatisfied) to four (very satisfied). The mean charity satisfaction rating is 3.28, indicating that
on average, participants were satisfied with the charity options. Participants who invested in CSR
donated an average of $1.42 of their own payout to charity, which was doubled by the
administrator. In total, $123.75 was donated to the seven charities, including the administrator
match. The percentage of charity donations made to each charity are as follows: 16.4% to
American Humane Association, 14.6% to American Red Cross, 11.5% to Amnesty International,
18.8% to Habitat for Humanity, 14.0% to Sierra Club, 15.8% to Susan G. Komen for the Cure,
and 9.1% to Wounded Warrior Project. Of the 94 students who participated in the experiment, 33
(35.1%) requested a receipt for the charitable donations be emailed to them.
Descriptive Statistics
Two experimental sessions were conducted for the Disclosure treatment (Sessions A and
B) and two experimental sessions were conducted for the Non-Disclosure treatment (Sessions C
and D). Descriptive statistics are reported by session in Table 2. The sessions were relatively
balanced, with 22, 24, 24, and 24 participants in Sessions A, B, C, and D, respectively. On
average, participants chose to invest in CSR 1.76 times. CooperateCounti is a continuous

7

Throughout the paper, reported correlations are based on a single observation per participant versus one
observation per participant-round. This methodological choice was made to reduce bias towards finding a
significant correlation between variables of interest.
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Table 2: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (p-values)
CSRInvestCounti

CooperateCounti

Disclosurei

Prosociali

CSRInvest
Counti
1.000

Cooperate
Counti
-0.025
(0.812)
1.000

Disclosurei

Prosociali

Altruismi

0.176*
(0.090)

0.162
(0.119)

-0.027
(0.797)

-0.205**
(0.048)

-0.107
(0.306)

1.000

CSRValuesi

Riski

Genderi

0.265***
(0.010)

0.161
(0.122)

0.129
(0.214)

0.131
(0.207)

-0.090
(0.387)

0.016
(0.882)

0.069
(0.511)

0.263**
(0.011)

-0.112
(0.284)

0.126
(0.227)

0.145
(0.164)

0.088
(0.397)

0.037
(0.726)

-0.110
(0.291)

-0.018
(0.867)

1.000

0.126
(0.225)

0.115
(0.268)

-0.014
(0.890)

-0.045
(0.665)

0.032
(0.758)

1.000

0.093
(0.371)

0.141
(0.175)

-0.229**
(0.026)

-0.003
(0.980)

1.000

0.230
(0.026)

0.052
(0.618)

0.203**
(0.049)

1.000

-0.013
(0.901)

0.108
(0.302)

1.000

-0.194*
(0.060)

Altruismi

CSRPreferencei

CSRValuesi

Riski

Genderi

CSRPreferencei

1.000
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Number of participants = 94
Number of observations = 94
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions
Altruismi
CooperateCounti
CSRInvestCounti
CSRPreferencei
CSRValuesi
Disclosurei
Prosociali
Genderi
Riski

Ranges in value from 20 to 100. Higher values represent greater levels of altruism;
Ranges in value from zero to 40. Number of times participant i chooses to cooperate
across 40 rounds;
Ranges in value from zero to four. Number of times participant i chooses to donate to
charity across four parts;
Ranges in value from one to ten. Higher values represent stronger preferences for
corporate social responsibility;
Ranges in value from one to 15. Higher values represent more positive beliefs
regarding people who donate to charity;
Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is randomly assigned to the
Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) treatment;
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is classified as prosocial
(proself);
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant is female (male);
Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk.
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variable equal to the count of times a participant chooses to cooperate across forty rounds and
ranges in value from zero to 40. The mean value for CooperateCounti equals 19.10, indicating
that on average, participants cooperate almost half of the time.
Test of Hypotheses
5.5.1. The Effect of CSR Disclosure on CSR Investment
Hypothesis 1 predicts that CSR investment is higher when CSR is disclosed than when
CSR is not disclosed. When CSR is disclosed, participants may invest in CSR for two nonmutually exclusive reasons. They may invest in CSR due to their individual preferences for CSR.
Additionally, participants may invest in CSR to signal their willingness to cooperate to their
partner. Even though CSR is costly, participants earn $6.30 if they both invest in CSR and
cooperate versus $5.00 if they do not invest in CSR and do not cooperate. In the CSR Disclosure
treatment, some participants may view the cost of investing in CSR as a signaling cost.
As shown in Figure 3, consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants invest in CSR 51.1% of
the time in the Disclosure treatment versus 37.0% of the time in the Non-Disclosure treatment (χ2
= 75.94, p < 0.001). The odds a participant will invest in CSR are 1.78 times higher when CSR
investment is disclosed versus when CSR investment is not disclosed. Participants make a CSR
investment decision at the start of Parts One, Two, Three, and Four. Two interesting patterns are
evident across the four parts. First, CSR investment decreases over time in both the Disclosure
and Non-Disclosure treatments. Second, CSR investment is always higher in the Disclosure
treatment than in the Non-Disclosure treatment. In Parts One, Two, and Four this difference is
highly significant (p < 0.001). In Part Three, the difference is marginally significant (p = 0.056).
In summary, results support Hypothesis 1, CSR investment is higher when CSR is disclosed
versus when CSR is not disclosed.
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Figure 3: CSR Investment Frequency
Number of participants = 94
Number of observations = 376
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
CSR Investment frequency is equal to the count of CSRInvesti,t equals one observations; where CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to donate (not donate) to charity in part t; where t = (1,
2, 3, 4).

5.5.2. The Effect of CSR Disclosure on Cooperation
Hypothesis 2 predicts that managers are more cooperative when CSR is disclosed than when
CSR is not disclosed. As shown in Figure 4, cooperation in the two Disclosure treatment sessions
(Sessions A and B) is higher than in one of the Non-Disclosure sessions (Session D), but lower
than the other Non-Disclosure session (Session C). Further, cooperation deteriorates over time in
three of the four experimental sessions. In the first five rounds participants cooperate
approximately 60% of the time. In Sessions A, B, and D there is a strong decline in cooperation
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over time and by the last five rounds, the frequency of cooperation is approximately 10%. In
Session C, the participants converge to the payoff-dominant strategy, with 99% of participants
cooperating in the final five rounds.

Figure 4: Cooperation by Round, Frequency
Cooperation frequency is equal to the count of Cooperatei,r equals one observations in each round by session; where
Cooperatei,r is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not cooperate) in round
r, where r = (1, 2, 3…, 40).

It is important to note that the stag hunt task has two pure strategy equilibria, mutual
cooperation (i.e. the payoff dominant strategy) and mutual non-cooperation (i.e. the risk
dominant strategy), and one mixed strategy equilibrium, in which each participants cooperate
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with probability p and do not cooperate with probability 1 – p. 8 I predict that in the Disclosure
treatment, CSR investment is a credible signal of cooperativeness and will help to establish a
convention of cooperation among CSR investors. However, in the Non-Disclosure treatment,
there is no opportunity for signaling. Thus, when there are multiple equilibria, equilibrium
analysis fails to predict which, if any equilibria will emerge. Experience teaches participants to
play either the risk-dominant action or the payoff-dominant action (e.g. Rankin et al. 2000;
Bosworth 2013). The pattern of results seen in the Non-Disclosure treatment is consistent with
prior studies which demonstrate variance across experimental sessions in terms of converge to
the payoff dominant equilibria, the risk dominant equilibria, or neither (e.g. Battalio et al. 2001).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the overall level of cooperation will be higher when CSR
investment is disclosed. Table 3 reports the frequency of cooperation, Cooperatei,r, an indicator
variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not cooperate) in round r.
Contrary to predictions, the frequency of cooperation is higher when CSR investment is not
disclosed versus when CSR investment is disclosed (54.0% versus 41.2%, χ2 = 61.845, p <
0.001, not tabulated). Further, as reported in Table 1, the mean level of cooperation,
CooperateCounti in the Disclosure treatment and the Non-Disclosure treatment are 16.48 and
21.60, respectively. Results suggest that cooperation is higher in the Non-Disclosure treatment
than in the Disclosure treatment (t-stat = 2.01, p = 0.048, not tabulated). Preliminary findings do
not support Hypothesis 2.

8

Participants would converge upon the mixed strategy equilibrium when they are indifferent between the payoffs
from mutual cooperation and mutual non-cooperation. As described in the experimental design, given the payouts
in my dissertation, the indifference point is p = 5/7. So the mixed strategy equilibrium in my task is where
participants cooperate with 71% probability and do not cooperate with 29% probability. Note that the payoffs
from the mixed strategy are ($5, $5). Any unilateral deviation from the mixed strategy equilibrium gives the
deviator the same payoff of $5, so she can’t do strictly better by deviating.
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As shown in Table 3, the frequency of cooperation in the two Disclosure sessions A and B is
47.7% and 35.2%, respectively. The frequency of cooperation in the two Non-Disclosure
sessions C and D is 88.2% and 19.8%, respectively. Given the differences in cooperation in
sessions within the same Disclosure treatment, I compare the level of cooperation,
CooperateCounti across the two Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) sessions. As reported in Table 1,
on average, the level of cooperation in the Disclosure treatment Sessions A and B is 19.09 and
14.08, respectively. This difference is marginally significant (t-stat = 1.41, p = 0.076, not
tabulated). On average, the level of cooperation in the Non-Disclosure treatment Sessions C and
Table 3: Cooperation Frequency (Observations)

Manager 1
CSR Investor

Disclosure
Session
A
B
n = 22
n = 24

Total
n = 46

Non-Disclosure
Session
C
D
Total
n = 24
n = 24
n = 48

57.3%
(330)

49.4%
(162)

54.7%
(492)

83.0%
(106)

21.0%
(162)

45.5%
(268)

51.5%
(760)

Non-CSR Investor

52.0%
(200)

30.0%
(248)

39.7%
(448)

85.3%
(224)

19.7%
(218)

52.9%
(442)

46.3%
(890)

Total

55.3%
(530)

37.6%
(410)

47.6%
(940)

84.6%
(330)

20.3%
(380)

50.1%
(710)

48.7%
(1,650)

42.0%
(200)

31.9%
(248)

36.4%
(448)

88.9%
(224)

19.7%
(218)

54.8%
(442)

45.5%
(890)

Non-CSR Investor

28.7%
(150)

34.8%
(302)

32.7%
(452)

90.9%
(406)

19.3%
(362)

57.2%
(768)

48.1%
(1,220)

Total

36.3%
(350)

33.5%
(550)

34.6%
(900)

90.2%
(630)

19.5%
(580)

56.3%
(1,210)

47.0%
(2,110)

47.7%
(880)

35.2%
(960)

41.2%
(1,840)

88.2%
(960)

19.8%
(960)

54.0%
(1,920)

47.7%
(3,760)

Manager 2
CSR Investor

Manager 1
Manager 2
Non-CSR Investor CSR Investor

All

Grand Total
n = 94

Cooperation is calculated as the frequency of Cooperatei,r equals one observations. Cooperatei,r is an indicator
variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not cooperate) in round r, where r = (1, 2, 3…, 40);
Participants are classified as a CSR investor (Non-CSR investor) if CSRInvesti,t equals one (zero). CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t; where t = (1, 2, 3, 4).
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D is 35.29 and 7.92, respectively. This difference is highly significant (t-stat = 20.66, p =
<0.001, not tabulated). 9
Next, I discuss multivariate tests of Hypothesis 2. Given there is a significant difference in
the cooperation across sessions, I estimate the following regression model:
CooperateCounti = α0 + α1 Disclosurei + α2 Sessioni + α3 Riski + ε

(1)

As shown in Table 2, risk preferences are highly correlated with the cooperation (r = 0.263, p =
0.011). Thus, Riski is included in the model. A positive and significant α1 would provide support
for H2. However, given the univariate results, α1 is most likely negative. Table 4 presents the
empirical results. Consistent with the univariate results, α1 and α2 are negative. The effect of CSR
Disclosure is marginally significant (t-stat = -1.82, p = 0.072). Further, Sessioni is negative and
highly significant (t-stat = -4.283, p < 0.001). As predicted, risk preferences are positively
associated with cooperation (t-stat = 1.982, p = 0.013). 10 Combined, the univariate and
multivariate results suggest that CSR disclosure does not lead to an overall higher level of
cooperation. Together, univariate and multivariate results do not provide support for Hypothesis
2.

9

I examined whether the convergence to the payoff dominant strategy equilibria in Session C and the risk dominant
strategy in Session D were, at least partially explained by systematic differences in stable, individual variables
across sessions (altruism, social value orientation, CSR values, risk preferences, and gender). I find that there are
no significant differences in individual difference variables across the Non-Disclosure treatments.

10

I also conducted regression analysis with all of the covariate variables in this study (altruism, social value
orientation, and CSR values). The covariates were not statistically significant in the analyses. A discussion of the
covariates is included in the Additional Analysis section.
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Table 4: Multivariate Test of Cooperation by Disclosure (H2)
CooperateCounti = α0 + α1 Disclosurei + α2 Sessioni + α3 Riski + ε
Explanatory Variables
Intercept
Disclosurei
Sessioni
Riski

Pred. Sign
+
0
+

Coefficient
26.325***
-4.202*
-4.283***
1.982**

Adj. R2
Number of participants
Number of observations

Std. Error
3.887
2.307
1.035
0.781

(1)
t-stat
6.77
-1.82
-4.14
2.54

p-value
<0.001
0.072
<0.001
0.013

0.244
94
94

Table 4 presents the results of a regression model employed to examine cooperation.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
CooperateCounti
Disclosurei
Riski
Sessioni

Ranges in value from zero to 40. Number of times participant i chooses to cooperate across
40 rounds;
Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i is randomly assigned to the Disclosure
(Non-Disclosure) treatment;
Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk;
A class variable that ranges in value from A to D. Participants in Sessions A and B (C and
D) were randomly assigned to the Disclosure (Non-Disclosure) treatment.

5.5.3. Cooperation when CSR is Disclosed
Hypothesis 3 posits that when CSR investment is disclosed, cooperation is highest among
CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations. As shown in Table 3, CSR investors cooperate
54.7% of the time when they are partnered with CSR investors versus 39.7% of the time when
they are partnered with Non-CSR investors (χ2 = 20.99, p < 0.001, not tabulated). When CSR
investment is disclosed, the odds a CSR investor will cooperate are 1.8 times as high when she is
partnered with a CSR investor versus when she is partnered with a non-CSR investor. When
CSR investment is disclosed, Non-CSR investors are less cooperative than CSR investors
(47.6%. versus 34.6%, χ2 = 32.06, p < 0.001, not tabulated). Further, unlike CSR investors, Non-
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CSR investors do not alter their behavior based on their partner’s CSR investment choice. There
is no difference in Non-CSR investors’ propensity to cooperate with either a CSR investor or a
Non-CSR investor (36.4% versus 32.7%, χ2 = 1.32, p = 0.251, not tabulated).
Univariate results provide strong preliminary support for H3. When CSR investment is
disclosed, the level of cooperation is highest among collaborations between CSR investors. To
further test H3, I estimate the following logistic regression model clustered at the participant
level with participant as the repeated measure in the Disclosure treatment:
Prob(Cooperatei,r) = α0 + α1 CSRInvesti,t + α2 PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
+ α3 CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t + α4 Riski

(2)

H3 predicts a positive interactive effect of CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t in the
Disclosure treatment. Panel A of Table 5 presents results of the logistic regression model
estimated in the Disclosure treatment. The main effect of CSR investment, CSRInvesti,t is
positive and highly significant (z-score = 3.03, p = 0.002). The main effect of partner CSR
investment, PartnerCSRInvest-i,t is not significant (z-score = 0.79, p = 0.429). The main variable
of interest, the interaction term, CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t is positive and significant (zscore = 2.36, p = 0.018). Riski is positively associated with cooperation (z-score = 2.09, p =
0.036).

11

These results suggest that CSR investors are more cooperative than Non-CSR

investors. Further, when CSR investors are partnered with a CSR investors they are even more
cooperative. In summary, univariate and multivariate results support H3 and suggest that when
CSR is disclosed, the most cooperative collaborations are between CSR investors.
To further investigate H3, I examine the level of cooperation failure and success within
business collaborations when CSR investment is disclosed. Given both partners must cooperate

11

I also conducted logistic regression analysis with all of the covariate variables in this study (e.g. demographics,
social value orientation, altruism, etc.). The covariates were not statistically significant in the analyses.
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to achieve the payoff dominant equilibria, cooperation failure is defined as a business
collaboration in which either no partner cooperated or one partner cooperated. Cooperation
success is therefore defined as a business collaboration in which both partners cooperate.
Empirical results are presented for the Disclosure treatment sessions A and B in Figure 5, Panels
A and B. Consistent with earlier findings, cooperation success is highest among CSR investor /
CSR investor collaborations. In Session A, CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations are
successful 34% of the time versus 26% for CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations and
8% for Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations. In Session B, CSR investor / CSR
investor collaborations are successful 26% of the time versus 11% for CSR investor / Non-CSR
investor collaborations and 17% for Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations.
Table 5: Multivariate Tests of Cooperation by CSR Investment (H3 and H4)
Panel A: Disclosure Treatment
Prob(Cooperatei,r) = α0 + α1 CSRInvesti,t + α2 PartnerCSRInvest-i,t + α3 CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
+ α4 Riski
(2)

Explanatory Variables
Intercept
CSRInvesti,t
PartnerCSRInvesti,t
CSRInvesti,t *PartnerCSRInvesti,t
Riski
Number of participants
Number of observations
Wald χ2
p-value

Pred.
Sign
+
+
+
+

Coefficient
-1.83556***
0.6657***
0.1243
0.5251**
0.2950**

Std.
Error
0.442
0.220
0.157
0.222
0.141

zscore
-4.15
3.03
0.79
2.36
2.09

p-value
<0.001
0.002
0.429
0.018
0.036

46
1,840
47.32
<0.0001

Table 5 Panel A presents the results of a repeated measures logistic regression model employed to examine
cooperation in the Disclosure treatment.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Variable Definitions:
Cooperatei,r
CSRInvesti,t
PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
Riski

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not
cooperate) in round r, where r = (1, 2, 3…, 40);
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to
charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3, 4);
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if a participant’s partner -i chooses to donate
(not donate) to charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3, 4);
Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk.

Panel B: Non-Disclosure Treatment
Prob(Cooperatei,r) = α0 + α1 CSRInvesti,t + α2 PartnerCSRInvest-i,t + α3 CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
+ α4 Riski
(2)

Explanatory Variables
Intercept
CSRInvesti,t
PartnerCSRInvesti,t
CSRInvesti,t *PartnerCSRInvesti,t
Riski
Number of participants
Number of observations
Wald χ2
p-value

Pred.
Sign
0
0
0
+

Coefficient
0.3175
0.0033
-0.0260
-0.0483
0.3010

Std.
Error
0.822
0.220
0.176
0.280
0.240

zscore
-0.39
0.02
-0.15
-0.17
1.25

p-value
0.699
0.988
0.883
0.863
0.210

46
1,840
47.32
<0.0001

Table 5 Panel B presents the results of a repeated measures logistic regression model employed to examine
cooperation in the Non-Disclosure treatment.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
Cooperatei,r
CSRInvesti,t
PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
Riski

An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i chooses to cooperate (not
cooperate) in round r, where r= (1, 2, 3…, 40);
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if participant i donates (does not donate) to
charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3…, 40);
An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if a participant’s partner -i donates (does not
donate) to charity in part t, where t = (1, 2, 3…, 40);
Ranges in value from one to five. Higher values represent preferences for greater risk.

Results suggest that disclosure of CSR investment is an effective signaling mechanism
that facilitates cooperation in business collaborations. When CSR investment is disclosed, the
odds of cooperation success are 2.3 times higher when both partners invest in CSR versus when
one or both partners does not invest in CSR (χ2 = 47.58, p < 0.001, not tabulated).
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Figure 5: Cooperation in Business Collaborations
Panel A: Disclosure Treatment – Session A
Number of participants = 22, Number of observations = 440
Participants are classified as a CSR investor (Non-CSR investor) if CSRInvesti,t equals one (zero). CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t; where t = (1, 2, 3, 4).

Panel B: Disclosure Treatment – Session B
Number of participants = 24, Number of observations = 480
Participants are classified as a CSR investor (Non-CSR investor) if CSRInvesti,t equals one (zero). CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t; where t = (1, 2, 3, 4).
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Panel C: Non-Disclosure Treatment – Session C
Number of participants = 24, Number of observations = 480
Participants are classified as a CSR investor (Non-CSR investor) if CSRInvesti,t equals one (zero). CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t; where t = (1, 2, 3, 4).

Panel D: Non-Disclosure Treatment – Session D
Number of participants = 24, Number of observations = 480
Participants are classified as a CSR investor (Non-CSR investor) if CSRInvesti,t equals one (zero). CSRInvesti,t is an
indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the participant i chooses to donate to charity in part t; where t = (1, 2, 3, 4).
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5.5.4. Cooperation when CSR is Not Disclosed
Hypothesis 4 posits that when CSR investment is not disclosed, CSR investors are no
more likely to cooperate in business collaborations than Non-CSR investors. As shown in Table
3, on average, CSR investors cooperate less frequently than Non-CSR investors when CSR
investment is not disclosed (50.1% versus 56.3%, χ2 = 6.79, p = 0.009, not tabulated). Further,
Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations have the highest level of cooperation and
CSR investor / CSR investor collaboration have the lowest level of cooperation (57.2%. versus
45.5%, χ2 = 10.84, p < 0.001, not tabulated). Based on the univariate results, I fail to reject the
null H4.
To further test H4, I estimate the following logistic regression model clustered at the
participant level with participant as the repeated measure in the Non-Disclosure treatment:
Prob(Cooperatei,r) = α0 + α1 CSRInvesti,t + α2 PartnerCSRInvest-i,t
+ α3 CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t + α4 Riski

(2)

H4 predicts a non-significant main effect for CSRInvesti,t and PartnerCSRInvest-i,t, and a nonsignificant interactive effect of CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t in the Non-Disclosure
treatment. Panel B of Table 5 presents results of the logistic regression model estimated in the
Non-Disclosure treatment. Neither the main effects of CSRInvesti,t and PartnerCSRInvest-i,t , nor
the interaction term, CSRInvesti,t * PartnerCSRInvest-i,t is significant. These results suggest that
when CSR investment is not disclosed, CSR investors are no more cooperative than Non-CSR
investors. In summary, based on univariate and multivariate results, I fail to reject the null H4.
Contrary to expectations, Riski is also not significant. 12 Additionally, I examine the level
of business collaboration cooperation failure and success when CSR investment is not disclosed.

12

I also conducted logistic regression analysis with all of the covariate variables in this study (e.g. demographics,
social value orientation, altruism, etc.). The covariates were not statistically significant in the analyses.
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Empirical results are presented for the Non-Disclosure treatment sessions C and D in Figure 5,
Panels C and D. As discussed earlier, Session C converged to the payoff-dominant equilibria,
which is evidenced by the high rates of collaboration success across the three collaboration
categories. Conversely, Session D converged to the risk-dominant equilibria, hence the almost
negligible rates of cooperation success across all collaboration categories.
Hypothesis 4 posits that the relative rate of cooperation success will not be higher for
CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations in Non-Disclosure treatment. In Session C, CSR
investor / CSR investor collaborations are successful 70% of the time versus 77% for CSR
investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations and 82% for Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor
collaborations. In Session D, CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations are successful 4% of
the time versus 4% for CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations and 7% for Non-CSR
investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations. Collaboration success is lowest in the CSR investor /
CSR investor collaborations and highest in the Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor
collaborations. It is interesting to note that this pattern of cooperation success in the NonDisclosure treatment is the opposite of the pattern of results in the Disclosure treatment. When
CSR not disclosed, the odds of cooperation success are 1.4 times higher when both partners are
Non-CSR investors than when one or both of the partners is a CSR investor (χ2 = 12.89, p <
0.001, not tabulated).
In summary, results suggest CSR disclosure increases CSR investment, but it does not
lead to overall higher levels of cooperation in business collaborations. However, CSR disclosure
is an effective signal of manager’s propensity to cooperate. When CSR is disclosed, the highest
level of cooperation is between CSR investor / CSR investor collaborations and the lowest level
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of cooperation is between Non-CSR investor / Non-CSR investor collaborations. When CSR is
not disclosed, CSR investors are no more likely to cooperate than Non-CSR investors.
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6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Three individual difference variables are measured in the study (Rushton 1981), altruism,
social value orientation (Messick and McClintock 1968), and CSR values. Although the
individual difference variables were not significant covariates in the multivariate hypotheses
tests, I conduct additional analysis to examine whether the individual difference variables are
associated with CSR investment and/or cooperation.
Altruism
Altruism is measured using the 20-item Rushton Altruism Scale (Rushton et al. 1981).
Participants self-report how frequently they’ve completed various acts on a scale of one (never)
to four (very often). Items include: I have given directions to a stranger; I have let a neighbor
whom I didn’t know too well borrow an item of some value to me (a dish, tools, etc.); I have
offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street. The variable Altruismi ranges in
value from 20 to 100. The Altruism Scale has an internal consistency reliability of α = 0.89
(Rushton et al. 1981). Further, validity of the scale is demonstrated by the high level of correlation
between self-reported altruism scores and peer rated altruism scores (r = .56, p < 0.001) (Rushton et
al. 1981). Lastly, the Rushton Altruism Scale is correlated positively with various scales measuring
similar variables such as social responsibility, social interest, and emotional empathy (r = .59, p =
.010) (Rushton et al. 1981).

Two modifications were made to the scale items. The first question originally asked if the
participant had ever pushed a stranger’s car out of the snow. The question was changed to
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whether the participant had ever helped a stranded motorists by stopping or calling for help. This
modification was made because it rarely snows in the geographic area in which the experiment
was administered. The second modification was to change item 15 from asking whether the
participant had bought charity Christmas cards to holiday cards out of cultural and religious
considerations.
Social Value Orientation
Social value orientation, a preference that affects behavior in strategic dilemmas, was
first introduced over 50 years ago by Messick and McClintock (1968). Social-value orientation
refers to other-regarding versus self-regarding preferences and is an important determinant of
cooperative motives, strategies, and choices in social interactions (Bogaert et al. 2008). The two
fundamental social-value orientations are prosocial and proself. Prosocials are concerned with
maximizing outcomes for themselves and others and seek win-win situations. Proselfs are
concerned with maximizing their own outcomes (Bogaert et al. 2008). Based on a review of the
social value orientation literature, 46% of the experimental population are prosocial, 50% are
proself, and the remainder are unclassified (Au and Kwong 2004).
Prosocials have a stronger sense of social responsibility and concern for others than
proselfs (Bogaert et al. 2008). The vast majority of prosocials are conditional cooperatives who
value maximizing joint outcomes and equality of outcomes. 13 The term conditional implies that
prosocials cooperate in social dilemmas when they believe that their partner will also cooperate.
Thus, prosocials are very sensitive to signals of cooperativeness, as this validates their

13

98% of prosocials are conditional cooperators, while 2% are altruists (Au and Kwong 2004). Altruists are more
concerned with a positive outcome for others than for themselves and are likely to remain cooperative even when
their partner is non-cooperative.
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expectation that their cooperation will be reciprocated and reduces their fear of being exploited
(Bogaert et al. 2008).
In contrast to prosocials, proselfs are concerned with maximizing their own outcomes.
The two main categories of proselfs are individualists and competitors (Au and Kwong 2004).
Individualists are concerned with maximizing their own outcomes and have little or no concern
for others’ outcomes. Like individualists, competitors strive to maximize their own outcomes.
However, competitors also seek relative advantage over others and view social dilemmas as winlose situations (Bogaert et al. 2008). Since proselfs are generally non-cooperative, they are not
particularly sensitive to signals of cooperativeness.
Social value orientation has substantial ecological validity in predicting behaviors in real
world situations. For instance, McClintock and Allison (1989) sent letters to undergraduate
students requesting they commit to volunteer to a worthy cause in the following semester.
Among the students who responded, the prosocials pledged to donate more hours than proselfs.
Prosocial commuters prefer commuting by public transportation when other commuters were
expected to go by public transportation, while proselfs only prefer public transportation when
others are expected to commute by car (Van Vugt et al. 1995).
In summary, prosocials are other-regarding and are less likely to act opportunistically in
collaborative environments than proselfs (Balliet et al. 2009; Brekke and Nyborg 2008). In my
setting, this implies that prosocials are more likely to invest in CSR and will be more sensitive to
CSR disclosure than proselfs. As shown in Appendix A, social value orientation is measured
using a set of nine hypothetical payouts between oneself and another person.
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CSR Values
There is no validated scale that measures CSR Values. Therefore, I included the
following three items to capture the elements of CSR values that are relevant for this study. As
shown in Appendix A, the items are as follows: I share the same values with people who donate
to charity (CSRValues1i); People who donate to charity care about others (CSRValues2i); People
who donate to charity are cooperative (CSRValues3i). Participants respond on a scale of one
(Strongly Disagree) to five (Strongly Agree). The three items are highly correlated with one
another; CSRValues1i and CSRValues2i (r = 0.4756, p < 0.001, not tabulated), CSRValues1i and
CSRValues3i (r = 0.5752, p < 0.001, not tabulated), CSRValues2i and CSRValues3i (r = 0.6261, p
< 0.001, not tabulated). For sake of parsimony, I create a single measure, CSRValuesi equal to
the sum of the three items. Scores for CSRValuesi range from one to 15. A Cronbach’s alpha was
computed to assess the internal consistency of CSRValuesi. The CSRValuesi measure (α = 0.79)
was deemed adequately reliable for this sample.
As discussed in the prior section, results indicate that CSR investors are more likely to
cooperate with CSR investors than with non-CSR investors when CSR is disclosed. The reason
for this relationship is that CSR investors are posited to believe that other CSR investors share
their values and have a propensity to cooperate. The CSR values scale measures the strength of
these beliefs. Next, I test whether the individual difference variables are associated with CSR
investment and/or cooperation.
Analysis of Individual Differences
As shown in Table 1, the mean Altruismi score is 53.23 out of 100. The mean score for
Prosociali is 0.70, indicating that 70% of participants are categorized as prosocial and 30% are
categorized as proself. The proportion of prosocials in my study is higher than the average level
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of prosocials in the experimental population (Au and Kwong 2004). The mean CSRValuesi score
is 10.70 out of 15, indicating relatively high CSR values. Since these are individual difference
variables, the mean scores should be relatively stable across treatments. Consistent with this
expectation mean Altruismi (54.61 versus 51.92, t-stat = 1.40, p = 0.1643, not tabulated) and
CSRValuesi (10.78 versus 10.63, t-stat = -0.35, p = 0.7262, not tabulated) scores do not differ in
the Disclosure treatment versus the Non-Disclosure treatment. However, there are more
prosocials in the Disclosure treatment than in the Non-Disclosure treatment (76.1% versus
64.6%, χ2 = 59.45, p < 0.001, not tabulated).
The individual difference variables appear to capture independent constructs. As shown
in Table 2, Altruismi is not correlated with Prosociali (r = 0.126, p = 0.225). CSRValuesi is not
correlated with either Altruismi (r = 0.141, p = 0.175) or Prosociali (r = -0.014, p = 0.890). The
Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.22), indicates an unacceptable level of internal consistency among the
three individual difference variables. However, CSRValuesi is correlated with CSRPreferencei ,
an individual difference variable that measures participants’ preferences for CSR. Given these
constructs are similar, it is not surprising that the variables are correlated.
Contrary to expectations, the individual difference variables are not correlated with CSR
investment: Altruismi (r = -0.027, p = 0.797), Prosociali (r = 0.162, p = 0.119), CSRValuesi (r =
0.161, p = 0.122). Neither are they correlated with cooperation Altruismi (r = -0.090, p = 0.387),
Prosociali (r = -0.107, p = 0.306), CSRValuesi (r = 0.069, p = 0.511). To further examine
whether individual differences are associated with participants’ choices, vis-à-vis CSR
investment and cooperation. I estimate the following logistic regression model clustered at the
participant level with participant as the repeated measure by Disclosure treatment to examine
CSR investment:
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Prob(CSRInvesti,t) = α0 + α1 AltruismDumi + α2 Prosociali + α3 CSRValuesDumi

(3)

Where AltruismDumi is an indicator variable equal to one if a participant’s score is greater than
the mean (median) score for Altruismi, and zero otherwise. CSRValuesDumi is an indicator
variable equal to one if a participant’s score is greater than the mean (median) score for
CSRValuesi, and zero otherwise. Indicator variables are used in lieu of continuous variables to
facilitate interpretation of the logistic regression results.
The model is poorly specified in the Disclosure treatment (Wald χ2 = 4.81, p = 0.304) and
the Non-Disclosure treatment (Wald χ2 = 4.66, p = 0.324). The individual differences variables
are not statistically significant in either the Disclosure treatment or the Non-Disclosure
treatment. Given the lack of statistical significance, results are not tabulated.
Next, I examine whether individual differences are associated with cooperation. I
estimate the following logistic regression model clustered at the participant level with participant
as the repeated measure by Disclosure treatment:
Prob(Cooperatei,r) = α0 + α1 AltruismDumi + α2 Prosociali + α3 CSRValuesDumi

(4)

The model is poorly specified in the Disclosure treatment (Wald χ2 = 3.48, p = 0.330) and
the Non-Disclosure treatment (Wald χ2 = 1.84, p = 0.607). The individual differences variables
are not statistically significant in either the Disclosure treatment or the Non-Disclosure
treatment. Given the lack of statistical significance, results are not tabulated.
Lastly, I examine whether prosocials CSR investors more sensitive to CSR disclosure
than proself CSR investors. When CSR investment is disclosed, prosocial CSR investors
cooperate 56.0% of the time when partnered with CSR investors versus 39.3% of the time when
partnered with non-CSR investors (χ2 = 21.81, p < 0.001, not tabulated). The odds of a prosocial
CSR investor cooperating are twice as high when she is partnered with a CSR investor versus a
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non-CSR investor. Conversely, proself CSR investors do not attend to CSR disclosure. When
CSR investment is disclosed, proself CSR investors are equally likely to cooperate when
partnered with a CSR investors versus a non-CSR investor (49.5% versus 42.6%, χ2 = 0.72, p =
0.398, not tabulated). These results are consistent with notion that prosocials are conditional
cooperators and are more sensitive to signals of their partners’ propensity to cooperate than
proselfs.

74

7. CONCLUSION
Despite the prevalence of CSR, we know very little about why managers invest in CSR
and disclose CSR activities. Using a strategic interaction task, I experimentally examine the links
between CSR investment, CSR disclosure, and cooperation in business collaborations. The use
of a controlled laboratory experiment allows me to manipulate CSR disclosure. While this is an
abstraction, it allows me to measure the effect of CSR disclosure on CSR investment and
cooperation in business collaborations.
Business collaborations can be a strong source of competitive advantage, allowing
partners to combine the technologies, skills, relationships, and resources to reduce costs and
mitigate strategic risk, expand scale, and create access to new markets (Anderson and Sedatole
2003). Despite these benefits, approximately half of these ventures fail (Gerwin 2004; Lunnan
and Haugland 2008). One of the main reasons for the high rate of failure is a lack of cooperation,
known as relational risk (Das and Teng 1998; 2000). Business collaborations require partners to
invest significant levels of physical or human capital and coordinate joint activities to be
successful (Kanter 1994; Doz 1996). I examine whether disclosure of CSR investment can
facilitate cooperation in business collaborations. This is an important issue, since business
collaborations are an important driver of growth and competitiveness and cooperation can be
difficult to achieve because there is tension between managers’ desire to pursue what is in the
firm’s best interest and their desire to cooperate and it is difficult for firms to anticipate, monitor,
and compel cooperation in business collaborations.
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I operationalize the collaborative environment as a single-period, strategic interaction
stage hunt task where two managers simultaneously make decisions whether they will cooperate
or not cooperate. The parameters of the stag hunt task operationalize the strategic tension in
business collaborations. On one hand, managers’ highest payoffs occur when they both
cooperate. On the other hand, a manager’s lowest payoff occurs when she cooperates and her
partner does not. If a manager does not cooperate, her payoff is independent of her partner’s
choice. Thus, cooperation while wealth maximizing, entails risk; whereas non-cooperation is
riskless. In business collaborations, cooperation is necessary for success, but it involves risk. For
instance, collaborators may need to invest substantial resources, rely on individual suppliers, or
share proprietary information. If both partners cooperate, business collaborations can prove to be
mutually beneficial, improving supply chain management, opening access to new markets, or
reducing strategic risk. However, business collaborations can be very costly if partners do not
cooperate.
Results suggest that CSR disclosure increases CSR investment, but does not lead to
higher levels of overall cooperation in business collaborations. Further, CSR disclosure
moderates the link between managers’ CSR investment and cooperation in business
collaborations. When CSR is disclosed, CSR investors are more likely to cooperate than NonCSR investors. Further, CSR investors are more sensitive to CSR disclosure than Non-CSR
investors. CSR investors adjust their behavior dependent upon their partners’ CSR investment
choice and are more likely to cooperate with other CSR investors than with Non-CSR investors.
However, Non-CSR investors do not attend to CSR disclosures, and are equally likely to
cooperate with CSR investors or Non-CSR investors. Conversely, when CSR is not disclosed,
CSR investors are no more likely to cooperate than Non-CSR investors.
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I find that CSR disclosure facilitates cooperation among CSR investors. I predicted that as a
result, the overall higher level of cooperation in business collaborations would be higher when
CSR is disclosed versus when CSR is not disclosed. However, my results do not support this
hypothesis. In the Non-Disclosure treatment, participants converged to the payoff dominant
equilibria in one session and to the risk dominant equilibria in the other session. I operationalize
cooperation in business collaborations using a stag hunt task. The stag hunt task has two pure
strategy equilibria, the payoff dominant strategy equilibria and the risk dominant strategy
equilibria, and the mixed strategy equilibrium. When there are multiple equilibria, equilibrium
analysis fails to predict which, if any equilibria will emerge. Experience teaches participants to
play either the risk-dominant action or the payoff-dominant action (e.g. Rankin et al. 2000;
Bosworth 2013). The pattern of results seen in the Non-Disclosure treatment is consistent with
prior studies which demonstrate variance across experimental sessions in terms of converge to
the payoff dominant equilibria, the risk dominant equilibria, or neither (e.g. Battalio et al. 2001).
Findings from this study suggest that disclosure of CSR investment can help to mitigate
relational risk and solve coordination problems in interfirm settings. These results provide
empirical evidence regarding a potential rationale for and consequence of CSR disclosure. This
study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examining topics beyond the narrow
focus of financial disclosure and adds to the growing research examining issues surrounding
CSR.
There are several limitation to this study. Since participants in the study are not practicing
managers and the financial stakes are not as large as those in the field, I cannot be sure that my
results would generalize to field settings. However, there are no obvious reasons why managers
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would have weaker preferences for social responsibility than the participants in my experiments.
In fact, managers may have stronger social responsibility preferences given that they have access
to more resources and may feel an obligation to a broader group of stakeholders than just their
business collaboration partner (Moser and Martin 2012). Regarding the size of the financial
stakes, prior studies show that the results of experiments using smaller financial stakes generalize
fairly well to settings with larger stakes (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Falk and Heckman
2009).
Another limitation of the study is that CSR investment, operationalized as a charitable
donation, only captures one dimension of CSR. In practice, there is substantial industry, geopolitical, and firm level variation in CSR investment. Further, unlike a charity donation, firms
often invest in CSR activities that mitigate potential costs or have a positive effect on future cash
flows. For instance, companies that operate in industries that entail a degree of risk to people or
the environment may be more motivated to invest in CSR to stave off criticism and avoid costly
regulation. The operationalization of CSR as a charity donation limits the generalizability of the
results. Future research should examine the effect of CSR investment and disclosure using
alternative measures of CSR investment beyond charity donations.
Further, in the experiment, CSR investment is measured as a dichotomous variable.
Participants choose whether or not to donate 10% of their stag hunt task payoff to charity.
Charity donations have been used in prior experimental studies (e.g. Brekke et al. 2011;
Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Martin and Moser 2016). However, my study differs in that the level of
charity donation is fixed at 10% and I do not allow participants to select from an array of charity
donation levels (e.g. 10%, 20%, 30%). As a consequence, results from this study do not allow for
inferences regarding the effect of the level of CSR investment on cooperation in business
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collaborations. While this is an important question, the focus of this study is on the effect of
disclosure of CSR investment. Operationalizing CSR investment as a dichotomous variable
limits the generalizability of the results, as there is variation in level of CSR investment in real
world. Experimental evidence suggests that higher CSR investment are associated with higher
levels of costly effort and higher motivation (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Koppel and Regner
2014). In my dissertation, charity donations are limited to the lowest level used in prior studies,
which would bias against finding a result.
Similar to CSR investment, CSR disclosure is also a dichotomous. In the CSR Disclosure
treatment CSR investment is disclosed; in the non-CSR Disclosure treatment CSR investment is
not disclosed. The purpose of this study is to examine whether disclosure of CSR investment is
viewed as a credible signal of managers’ propensity to cooperate in a business collaboration.
Thus, I controlled for the level and type of CSR disclosure. However, in the real world, there is
significant variation in CSR disclosure. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it is important
to investigate the effect of differences in CSR disclosure, and is an area for future research.
Even though participants are in the same room, all communication is conducted
electronically. This is a limitation of the study as prior research indicates that the method of
communication can influence the outcome of interactions (Rowe 2004; Lynch et al. 2009)
Consequently, findings of the study may not generalize to business collaborations in which
managers’ communication is predominantly face-to-face versus electronic. This limitation
provides the opportunity for future research that examines whether the form of business
collaboration interaction interacts with CSR investment and disclosure.
This study answers recent calls for experimental CSR research in accounting and
contributes to the CSR, business collaboration, and internal control literatures in accounting in
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several ways (Peteraf 1993; Moser and Martin 2012; Huang and Watson 2015). First, I build on
research examining the use of informal control mechanisms to encourage cooperation in
intrafirm collaborations (Towry 2003; Rowe 2004; Kelly and Presslee 2017). I build on these
findings by exploring whether CSR disclosure is informative of managerial preferences for
cooperation and facilitates cooperation in a business collaboration. In addition, this study
contributes to the CSR literature by examining whether disclosure of CSR investments mitigates
relational risk to improve business collaboration outcomes.
Further, I build on accounting research that examines whether disclosure of CSR
investment is informative of managerial type (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2012;
Hoi et al. 2013). This is the first study to examine the role of CSR investment and disclosure on
cooperation in business collaborations. Cooperation in business collaborations is an important
issue to both accounting academics and practitioners, as nearly half of these ventures end in
failure (Gerwin 2004; Lunnan and Haugland 2008).
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APPENDIX A: Experimental Instrument
VERBAL CONSENT FORM

USF IRB ID # PRO00031293
Today’s research study is being conducted in partnership with the University of South
Florida. Researchers at the University of South Florida study many topics. To do this, we need
the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. We are asking you to take part in a
research study that is called: SH Decision Study.
The person who is in charge of this research study is Sukari Farrington. This person is
called the Principal Investigator.
You are being asked to participate because you are a student at Chapman University and
registered with the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University. The purpose of this study
is to study your choices in an interactive environment.
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to make a series of choices. Information
about these choices is explained in the attached instructions. The instructions will also be
provided on the computers and you will be asked to complete an instruction quiz. Data will be
collected and stored by the Principal Investigator and by research personnel at the Economic
Science Institute and by research personnel at the University of South Florida.
You can choose not to participate in this research study. However, you will not receive
compensation if you do not participate.
You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer and should not feel that
there is any pressure to take part in the study. You are free to participate in this research or
withdraw at any time. Compensation is not considered a benefit in research studies. As such, you
will receive no benefit from this study. There will be no penalty if you stop taking part in this
study. The decision to participate or not to participate will not affect your student status (course
grade) or job status.
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This research is considered to be minimal risk.
You will receive compensation for your participation in this study. You will receive a
show-up fee and you will receive payment based on your choices and the choices of the other
participants in today’s study. I cannot guarantee how much you will earn, since your earnings are
dependent on your choices and the choices of the other participants in today’s study. However,
you can earn between $0 and $19, not including the show-up fee.
We must keep your study records as confidential as possible. We may publish what we
learn from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your name. We will not publish
anything else that would let people know who you are. However, certain people may need to see
your study records. By law, anyone who looks at your records must keep them completely
confidential. The only people who will be allowed to see these records are:
• The research team, including the Principal Investigator, the Advising Professor, and all
other research staff.
• Certain government and university people who need to know more about the study. For
example, individuals who provide oversight on this study may need to look at your records. This
is done to make sure that we are doing the study in the right way. They also need to make sure
that we are protecting your rights and your safety.) These include:
•
•

The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the staff that work
for the IRB. Other individuals who work for USF that provide other kinds of oversight
may also need to look at your records.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

If you have any questions about this study, you can contact the investigator, Sukari Farrington at
(714) 516-5761 or by email at sfarring@chapman.edu. If you have question about your rights as
a research participant please contact the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact by email at
RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.
Would you like to participate in this study?
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INSTRUCTIONS
Overview
Today, you will interact with other people in an experiment divided into 4 parts of 10 rounds
each for a total of 40 rounds. You will be randomly paired with a different person in each
round. All of your choices will remain anonymous.
At the end of today’s experiment, 1 round from each of the 4 parts will be randomly selected to
determine your cash payout. Your cash payout depends on your choice and the choice of each
person you are randomly paired with during the 4 randomly selected rounds.
Earnings will be expressed in experimental currency called francs. The sum of the francs in the 4
randomly selected rounds will be used to determine your cash payoff. Francs will be converted to
dollars at a rate of 2 francs = 1 US dollar.
If you have any questions at any point in today’s session, please raise your hand and the
administrator will answer your questions in private.
Now let’s talk about what you will do in the experiment…
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Matrix Information
You will see a matrix similar to the one below. The matrix consists of four quadrants. Notice the
numbers in each quadrant. The numbers represent the francs that you (labeled “Me”) and the
other person (labeled “Partner”) earn each round. These values will remain the same for all 40
rounds.
Your earnings are on the left in blue. Your partner’s earnings are on the right in red.

In each round, you and your partner will each make a choice that determines both of your
earnings in the round.
You will make a choice of either TOP or BOTTOM.
Your partner will make a choice of either LEFT or RIGHT.
Once everyone in today’s session has made their choice, the choices that you and your partner
made will be displayed.
Let’s look at some examples to see how different choices determine your earnings and your
partner’s earnings.
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If you choose TOP and your partner chooses LEFT you would earn 7 francs and your partner
would earn 7 francs.

If you choose TOP and your partner chooses RIGHT you would earn 0 francs and your partner
would earn 5 francs.
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If you choose BOTTOM and your partner chooses LEFT you would earn 5 francs and your
partner would earn 0 francs.

If you choose BOTTOM and your partner chooses RIGHT you would earn 5 francs and your
partner would earn 50 francs.

Notice that if you choose BOTTOM no matter what your partner chooses, you earn 5 francs.
Notice that if you choose TOP your earnings depend on what your partner chooses. If your
partner chooses LEFT you will earn 7 francs. However, if your partner chooses RIGHT you will
earn 0 francs.
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Charity Donation
At the start of each of the four parts you can choose whether or not to donate 10% of your
earnings to charity. If you choose to donate 10% of your earnings to charity, the amount will be
matched by the administrator and your donation will be doubled. The choice you make at the
start of each part will only affect your payout for that part. It will not affect anyone else’s payout.
It will not affect your payout for any other part. In other words, your choice of whether or not to
donate to charity in Part 2 will only affect your payout in Part 2. It will not affect your payout in
Parts 1, 3, or 4.
If you chose to donate to charity, you will be able to select which charity you want to donate to
from a list of charities. Below is an alphabetical list of the charities options with a brief
description of each.
•

American Humane Association - Protects and ensures the welfare, wellness, and wellbeing of children and animals. Unleashes the full potential of the bond between humans
and animals to the mutual benefit of both.

•

American Red Cross – Provides compassionate care to those in need by preventing and
relieving suffering through disaster relief, supporting military families, blood donations,
and other services.

•

Amnesty International – Promotes the dignity and well-being of every person by
exposing and preventing human rights abuses throughout the world.

•

Habitat for Humanity – Builds renovates and preserves homes to broaden access to
affordable housing to help break the cycle of poverty.

•

Sierra Club – Practices and promotes the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and
resources. Educates and enlists humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural
and human environment.

•

Susan G. Komen for the Cure – Addresses breast cancer on multiple fronts such as
research community health global outreach and public policy initiatives in order to make
the biggest impact against the disease.

•

Wounded Warrior Project – Serves veterans and service members who incurred a
physical or mental injury, illness, or wound co-incident to their military service since
September 11, 2001 and their families.
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DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Everyone else in today’s experiment will also choose whether or not to donate 10% of their
earnings to charity at the start of each part. While you and everyone else will remain anonymous
throughout today’s experiment, you will be able to see if your partner chose to donate to charity.
Your partner will also be able to see if you chose to donate to charity. The labels “Donor” and
“Non-Donor” will appear next to “Me” and “Partner” each round. The label “Donor” indicates
the choice to donate to charity. The label “Non-Donor” indicates a choice not to donate to
charity. You and your partner will only be able to determine the donation choice made in the
current part of the experiment. Neither you nor your partner will be able to see which donation
choice was made in prior parts.
At the end of today’s session, the administrator will double all donations and make an online
donation to each charity selected. The administrator will make a single donation to each charity
equal to the donations from everyone in today’s experiment plus the administrator match
amount. At the end of the experiment, you will have the opportunity to provide your email
address to receive a copy of the receipt for the charitable donations.
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The labels “Donor” or “Non-Donor” will appear next to “Me” and “Partner” depending on the
charity donation choices made by you and your partner. Below are two examples:

Your partner CAN see the “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label and will know your charity donation
choice. You CAN see your partner’s “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label and you will know your
partner’s charity donation choice.
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History Table
The History table records the charity donation choice, matrix decision, your earnings, and your
partner’s earnings in each round. Note that earnings for Donors do not include the deduction of
the 10% charity donation.
Below is an illustrative example of the History table:
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NON-DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Everyone else in today’s experiment will also choose whether or not to donate 10% of their cash
payout to charity at the start of each part. You and everyone else will remain anonymous
throughout today’s session; you will not be able to see if your partner chose to donate to charity.
Your partner will not be able to see if you chose to donate to charity. The label “Donor” or
“Non-Donor” will appear next to “Me” each round. The label “Donor” indicates your choice to
donate to charity. The label “Non-Donor” indicates your choice not to donate to charity. The
labels will only indicate the donation choice you made in the current part of the experiment.
Only you can see the labels. Your partner cannot see the labels and you cannot see your partners’
labels. Neither you nor your partner will be able to see which donation choice was made in prior
parts.
At the end of today’s session, the administrator will double all donations and make an online
donation to each charity selected. The administrator will make a single donation to each charity
equal to the donations from everyone in today’s experiment plus the administrator match
amount. At the end of the experiment, you will have the opportunity to provide your email
address to receive a copy of the receipt for the charitable donations.
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The label “Donor” or “Non-Donor” will appear next to “Me” depending on your charity donation
choice. Below are two examples:

Your partner CANNOT see the “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label and will not know your charity
donation choice. You CANNOT see your partner’s “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label and you will
not know your partner’s charity donation choice.

99

History Table
The History table records the charity donation choice, matrix decision, your earnings, and your
partner’s earnings in each round. Note that earnings for Donors do not include the deduction of
the 10% charity donation.
Below is an illustrative example of the History table:
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Questionnaire, Virtual Coin Toss, and Payouts
After completing the 40 rounds, you will be asked to provide information about yourself. All of
your answers to these questions are anonymous and will not affect your cash payout in anyway.
Lastly, you will be asked to choose a virtual coin toss from a series of five options. You will
receive a cash payout based on the option you choose and the outcome of the virtual coin toss.
Your payout from the virtual coin toss will have no effect on your payout from the randomly
selected four rounds of the experimental task.
Lastly, you will be informed which four rounds were randomly selected, your cash payout, and
the amount, if any, that will be donated to charity on your behalf. You will remain seated until
you are called to the front to receive your cash payout. After receiving your cash payout, you are
free to go.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the administrator will answer your
questions in private.
If you do not have any questions, please complete a quiz on the instructions.
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QUIZ
Please take a few minutes to complete the quiz.
Question 1
All of the people in this experiment, including you, chose whether or not to donate 10% of their
earnings to a charity at the start of each of part.
Answer: True
Hint: Everyone choses whether or not to donate 10% of their earnings to charity at the start of
each of the four parts of the experiment.
Question 2
One round from each of the four parts will be randomly selected to determine your cash payout.
Answer: True
Hint: One round will be randomly selected from each part to determine your cash payout.
Question 3
If you choose to donate 10% of my cash payout from the experimental task to charity, the
amount will be tripled by the administrator.
Answer: False
Hint: Charity donation amounts will be doubled by the administrator.
Question 4
In each round, you will be able to see whether or not your partner chose to donate to charity and
your partner will be able to see whether or not you chose to donate to charity.
DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Answer: True
Hint: The labels “Donor” and/or “Non-Donor” will appear next to “Me” and “Partner” each
round.
NON-DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Answer: False
Hint: You will not be able to see your partner’s “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label. Your partner
will not be able to see your “Donor” or “Non-Donor” label.
Question 5
You will be matched with the same partner each round.
Answer: False
In each round you will be randomly matched with a different partner.
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Please refer to the matrix on pages 2-4 in the instructions to answer the following questions:
Question 6
If you choose TOP and your partner chooses RIGHT you earn ____ francs.
Answer: 0
Hint: You earn 0 francs and your partner earns 5 francs..
Question 7
If you choose BOTTOM and your partner chooses LEFT, you earn _____ francs.
Answer: 5 francs
Hint: You earn 5 francs and your partner earns 0 francs.
Question 8
If you choose TOP and your partner chooses LEFT, your partner earns _____ francs.
Answer: 7
Hint: You earn 7 francs and your partner earns 7 francs.
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EXPERIMENTAL TASK
You will now start Part 1 [2, 3, 4]
Would you like to donate 10% of your earnings to charity?
Yes, I want to donate
American Humane Association
American Red Cross
Amnesty International
Habitat for Humanity
Sierra Club
Susan G. Komen for the Cure
Wounded Warrior Project
No, I don’t want to donate
DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Partner (Donor / Non-Donor)*
LEFT

Me (Donor /
Non-Donor)*

RIGHT

TOP

7,7

0,5

BOTTOM

5,0

5, 5

NON-DISCLOSURE TREATMENT
Partner
LEFT

Me (Donor /
Non-Donor)*

RIGHT

TOP

7,7

0,5

BOTTOM

5,0

5, 5

*The term “Donor” (“Non-Donor”) indicates a participant chose (not) to donate to charity.
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QUESTIONNAIRRE
You are almost finished. Please take a few minutes to answer the following questions.
Please select the category that best indicates your level of agreement.
Strongly Somewhat
Disagree Agree

1 Companies should take
actions to help society.
2 I prefer to work for a
company that takes actions to
help society.
3 I share the same values with
people who donate to charity.
4 People who donate to charity
care about others.
5 People who donate to charity
are cooperative.
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Neither
Somewhat
Disagree Agree
nor
Agree

Strongly
Agree

You are asked to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person. This other
person is someone you do not know and you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and
the other person will be making choices by selecting one of three choices for the following nine
situations. Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the other person.
Likewise, the other person’s choice will produce points for him or her and for you. Every point
has value: The more points you receive, the better for you; the more points the other person
receives, the better for him or her. Keep in mind that the choices you make for this task will
NOT affect your cash payout. Further, there are no right or wrong choices - simply choose the
option you prefer most.
For each of the situations, choose the option you prefer most.

1

You get
Other person gets

A
480
80

B
540
280

C
480
480

2

You get
Other person gets

560
300

500
500

500
100

3

You get
Other person gets

520
520

520
120

580
320

4

You get
Other person gets

500
100

560
300

490
490

5

You get
Other person gets

560
300

500
500

490
90

6

You get
Other person gets

500
500

500
100

570
300

7

You get
Other person gets

510
510

560
300

510
110

8

You get
Other person gets

550
300

500
100

500
500

9

You get
Other person gets

480
100

490
490

540
300
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You had the option of donating to the following charities:
American Humane Association
American Red Cross
Amnesty International
Habitat for Humanity
Sierra Club
Susan G. Komen for the Cure
Wounded Warrior Project
How satisfied are you with these options? (Very Dissatisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied, Somewhat
Satisfied, Very Satisfied)
Please list any charities you would like to see added to the charity list (Open ended)
Were the instructions clear? (Very Confusing, Somewhat Confusing, Somewhat Clear, Very
Clear)
Age (18 to 40, over 40)
Gender (Male, Female, Other, Prefer not to answer)
Year (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior, Graduate student)
Estimate the number of college-level economics courses or business courses you’ve completed
or are currently enrolled in at Chapman or at another institution (0 to 30, over 30)

107

Almost done. Please indicate the frequency with which you have carried out the following acts.
Never

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16

17

18
19
20

I have helped a stranded motorist by stopping or
calling for help.
I have given directions to a stranger.
I have made change for a stranger.
I have given money to a charity.
I have given money to a stranger who needed it
(or asked me for it).
I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.
I have done volunteer work for a charity.
I have donated blood.
I have helped carry a stranger's belongings
(books, parcels, etc.).
I have delayed an elevator and held the door open
for a stranger.
I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in line
(at Xerox machine, in the supermarket, etc.).
I have given a stranger a lift in my car.
I have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the
supermarket, etc.)
I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well
borrow an item of some value to me (a dish,
tools, etc.).
I have bought charity holiday cards deliberately
because I knew it was a good cause.
I have helped a classmate who I did not know that
well with a homework assignment when my
knowledge was greater than his or hers.
I have before being asked, voluntarily looked
after a neighbor's pets or children without being
paid for it.
I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly
stranger across a street.
I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a
stranger who was standing.
I have helped an acquaintance to move
households.
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Once More Often
than
once

Very
often

COIN FLIP
Below is a set of computerized coin flips expressed in francs. You will receive a cash payout
depending on which coin flip you chose and the outcome of the computerized coin flip. We will
convert your points into dollars at a rate of 2 francs = 1 US dollar. Chose the coin flip you prefer:
3.2 francs if the coin flips heads and 3.2 francs if the coin flips tails.
4.8 francs if the coin flips heads and 2.4 francs if the coin flips tails.
6.4 francs if the coin flips heads and 1.6 francs if the coin flips tails.
8.0 francs if the coin flips heads and 0.8 francs if the coin flips tails.
9.6 francs if the coin flips heads and 0 francs if the coin flips tails.
The coin flipped ________ [heads/tails]. You earned _____ points.
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SUBMISSION
Congratulations! You are done. Let’s calculate your cash payout.
The following rounds were selected from each part to determine your payout:
Part One Round ___ , Part Two Round ___ , Part Three Round ___, Part Four Round ___
Your total francs earned today is: ______
Your total cash payout is $______
Payout Breakdown
$______ = Experimental earnings of $______ + Coin Flip earnings of $______
Total donations to charity: $______
Donation Breakdown
You donated to the following charities: _____________________
Total donation to charity of $______ = Your donation of $______ + Administrator’s
matching of $______
Fill in your name below to receive your cash payout.
First: _________
Last: ________
Student ID #: __________
If you want to see how much money was donated to each charity based on today’s sessions, fill
in your email below to receive a copy of each receipt. You will receive an email within 24 hours.
Email Address: (optional) ___________________________

FINISH

Please wait quietly until everyone is finished and the administrator informs you that today’s
session is complete. Thank you.

110

APPENDIX B: Screen Shots
Instructions

111

Quiz

112

Experimental Task

113

Questionnaire

Coin Flip

114

115

APPENDIX C: IRB Approval Letter

116

117

